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THE PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
There is evidence that average nominal wages on the 
U.S. side of the southern border are lower than those of the 
nonborder regions of the U.S.^ One possible explanation for 
this wage differential is that the border receives an inex­
haustible flow of legal and illegal Mexican labor which bids 
wages down in this region. More importantly, the continuous 
shifts in supply due to this influx keeps this wage differ­
ential from narrowing, making it permanent in nature. 
An alternative explanation of this wage differential is 
that border residents possess different socioeconomic char­
acteristics (such as different educational and skill levels 
or average hours and weeks worked) than do nonborder resi­
dents. Characteristics which, when properly controlled for, 
should decrease or eliminate this differential. 
The policy implications are different for both explana­
tions. If Mexican labor is the major source of this wage dif­
ferential, then further restrictions on Mexican labor entry 
might be justified. On the other hand, if this nominal wage 
differential is smaller or eliminated after controlling for 
differences in socioeconomic characteristics, then the argu­
ment for restricting illegal entry to narrow the wage differ­
ential in question is less persuasive. 
^Ericson (IQTCh) summarized research that ha? studied 
this phenomenon. 
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Very few studies to my knowledge have addressed the 
question of the border/nonborder wage differential, and 
only one, by Smith and Newman (1977), has empirically studied 
this wage differential by controlling for socioeconomic 
characteristics. Their methodology and empirical conclu­
sions are very important to this thesisj therefore, their 
study is briefly reviewed here. 
The data source they used is the Public Use Sample of 
the 1970 Census which provided them with a host of socio­
economic characteristics along with an annual earnings mea­
sure. To relate this measure to hourly "wages", they con­
trolled for hours and weeks worked. This avoids a bias if 
wage differentials exist due to more hours or weeks being 
worked in one region relative to another. 
Their research included three border SMSAs (Brownsville, 
Laredo, and Corpus Christi, Texas) and one nonborder SMSA 
(Houston, Texas).^ The number of observations used in their 
sample is equal to 5945. 
They used a dummy variable (border = 1) to distinguish 
between the two areas. The controls used in their multiple 
regression analysis are measures of race (dummy variables 
representing either Blacks or Mexican-Americans), sex, edu­
cation, marital status, and tenure (if the individual lived 
^The 1970 Census of Populations defined regions are 
mostly SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) 
though counties are sometimes used also. 
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in the same house five years before; had no intercounty 
move, a dummy variable; or worked in the central city, 
another dummy variable). Specifically, their model is of 
the following form; 
= f(Region; Marital Status; Race; Sex; Education; 
Occupation; Tenure; Hours Worked; Weeks Worked) 
where I is earnings and Region is the border/nonborder dummy 
variable. All of the control variables are dummy variables 
except for hours worked and weeks worked. 
Their first series of regressions substantiates the 
fact that there is a nominal wage differential between the 
two regions. In other words, nominal wages in the border 
region are lower ($1679 less a year) than nominal wages in 
the nonborder region, after controlling for various socio­
economic characteristics. " These results were statistically 
significant. 
Their next step was to compare real wages between the 
two regions. They did so by deflating their earnings measure 
by a cost of living index. Since the Brownsville area does 
not have a published measure of this index, they had to es­
timate it in a field study. The differential between the 
two regions fell to $684, implying that part of this differen­
tial can be attributed to cost of living differences between 
the border and nonborder areas. The dummy variable was also 
statistically significant. 
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Finally, when they subdivided their data into race 
(Mexican-American over non-Mexican-American), age, and 
occupational groups, they found that Mexican-Americans, the 
senior (ages 35-45 and 45-65), and the low wage occupational 
groups were the ones that exhibited the largest wage differ­
entials when compared to their counterparts of the nonborder 
region. Some possible explanations which they suggest for 
this phenomenon are lack of mobility for the elderly and the 
supply oriented argument mentioned at the outset of this 
chapter for the remaining two groups. 
Other than the above relevant conclusions, their major 
conclusion throughout their analysis is that the wage dif­
ferential is smaller than was previously believed. In fact, 
they concluded: 
...this differential is of the order of magnitude that 
it could represent the implicit premium that individu­
als along the border are willing to pay for non-
pecuniary advantages such as remaining close to their 
cultural heritage (Smith and Newman, 1977, p. 63). 
One major objective of this thesis is to contribute to 
the border/nonborder literature by overcoming some of the 
limitations of the Smith and Newman study. I do this by 
using more border and nonborder SMSAs in ray sample, and by 
using the l/lOOO tape for the Southwest U.S. of the Public 
Use Sample (PUS) rather than the l/lOO tape for Texas that 
Smith and Newman used. This provided me with a wider 
variety of SMSAs, while maintaining data manageability. The 
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rationale behind including more SMSAs can be divided into two 
parts. First, the conclusions of Smith and Newman are only 
applicable to Texas and exclude California. It is thus 
interesting to ask how general their results are. These two 
regions may have different socioeconomic characteristics. 
Second, their study does not properly control for SMSA size. 
A comparison between Brownsville and Houston may be mislead­
ing since Houston is a much larger SMSA than Brownsville. 
In my sample, the border SMSAs range from the SMSA sizes of 
San Diego, California to that of Laredo, Texas, while my 
interior SMSAs range from the SMSA sizes of Pueblo, Colorado 
to that of Los Angeles, California. I also redefined 
"border" by including only those SMSAs which are within 10 
miles of the border. This, I believe, is a better standard 
for selection since these SMSAs are not affected by legal 
Mexican workers who commute daily to work in the U.S. from 
Mexico. 
Another way I contribute to the border/nonborder wage 
differential literature is that I look at the importance of 
compensating wage differentials in the wage equations of 
non-Mexican-Americans and Mexican-Americans. I hypothesize 
that a short distance from the border and higher levels of 
Mexican-American concentration areas are both seen as non-
pecuniary benefits by Mexican-Americans since both give 
Mexican Americans proximity to their own people. These two 
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factors may explain, as suggested by Smith and Newman in 
the quote above, part of this wage differential between 
Houston and the other three border SMSAs, since these have 
both higher concentration levels of Mexican-Americans and 
are closer to the border. Similar tests are done on non-
Mexican- Americans to see if the results are unique to 
Mexican-Americans. 
This last contribution is also an attempt to "update" 
the border/nonborder vage differential literature with the 
general geographic wage differential literature. This 
point is explained more in the next chapter. It should be 
noted here, however, that these ideas are not new. Adam 
Smith (1973), in his Wealth of Nations, recognized com­
pensating factors as a guise of many wage differentials. 
In the mid 1970s, economists have formalized the compensat­
ing wage differential idea by analyzing these differentials 
with the "hedonic model". This model incorporates both 
individual and firm behavior. Individuals are depicted as 
maximizing their utility, which is a function of higher 
wages and working conditions. The firms are viewed as 
offering a variety of packages of pecuniary and nonpecuni-
ary characteristics. This model suggests that individuals 
having preference for a high wage and a "bad job" (as 
opposed to a low paying "good job") will take jobs with 
firms which offer such a compensation package. Consequently, 
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if you can measure and control for these differences in 
characteristics of jobs, it follows that net wage differen­
tials should be smaller than gross wage differentials. 
The hedonic model thus shows a theoretical explanation 
for the existence of a wage differential among Mexican-
Americans that may arise due to their differing locations 
from the border. Furthermore, it theoretically explains 
any wage differential which may be attributable to favorable 
nonpecuniary characteristics which border residents value. 
This thesis includes four more chapters. The second 
chapter reviews the literature dealing with geographic wage 
differentials and the border wage literature which preceded 
the Smith and Newman article and this thesis. The third 
chapter explains the hedonic model in more detail and also 
includes an industry model which shows how wages are 
equalized in the long-run among geographic regions. The 
fourth chapter describes the data sources, the models, and 
the tests used, as well as the empirical results of this 
thesis. The conclusions, including ideas for future research 
as well as policy implications, are presented in the fifth 
chapter. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis is an 
extension of Smith and Newman's (1977) study. Their re­
search, in turn, is based on the "north-south" geographic 
wage differential literature and several of the descriptive 
studies that have considered border problems. 
The north-south literature has focused on explaining 
why average nominal wages of the northern U.S. are higher 
than those of the southern U.S. Economists have found this 
phenomenon interesting due to its important theoretical, 
empirical, and policy decision implications. Theoretically, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, geographic wage differ­
entials should be equalized in the long-run in a market 
system. Therefore, a persistent wage differential between 
the two regions might imply that the market mechanism does 
not operate efficiently. Empirically, an issue of interest 
has been the migration patterns of wrkers and hov this 
is related to the north-south wage differential. Before 
the 1960s, there was a net outmigration of southern workers 
to the north, supporting the hypothesis that it was due to 
the higher northern wages. However, this relationship is 
not as clear if the recent migration patterns of workers 
from north to south are taken into account. In fact, this 
suggests that this wage differential may have reversed or 
that the migration decision of workers is due to other 
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factors. The policy implications of finding a wage differ­
ential, other things equal, are important too. if a wage 
differential does exist, then policy decisions to help the 
depressed region might be justified. These may take the form 
of helping the depressed region with manpower programs, or 
simply speeding up the outflow of workers from the region. 
Likewise, if this differential does not exist, then any 
policy prescription to change wages in one region may affect 
equilibrium conditions in the labor markets of both regions 
and, thus, may not be justifiable. 
Earlier studies of the north-south wage differential 
were concerned with explaining the sources of this wage dif­
ferential rather than investigating if this wage differential 
actually existed. The explanation primarily came from two 
sources; a different industrial mix between the two regions 
and an excess supply of labor in the south relative to the 
north. For example, Fuchs and Perlman (1960) found a dis­
proportionate share of low wage industries in the south, 
as well as finding that the growth of population in the 
south exceeded the net outmigration. Similarly, Douty 
(1958) found this wage differential attributable to much the 
same characteristics as Fuchs and Perlman. He did, however, 
introduce other socioeconomic characteristics, which proved 
to be important in later geographic differential literature 
research, such as color, age, sex, education, and degree of 
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unionization, into the geographic wage differential analysis. 
These studies were continued by other economists who 
tested other differences between the north and the south. 
Gallaway (1963), in one of these studies, looked at monop­
sony, deficient product demand, and differences in produc­
tion functions between the two regions as sources of this 
differential. He found little empirical support in his study 
for these, however. In another study, Scully (1969) re­
gressed earnings on the capital/labor ratio (as a proxy for 
an excess supply of labor earnings to capital), union 
activity, nonwhite production workers, and the percentage of 
females in the labor force. He found these characteristics 
to be of the right sign and significant contributors to the 
determination of earnings. This was an important contribu­
tion since he empirically tested some of the previously 
untested hypotheses. 
Unlike these earlier studies, recent research has ques­
tioned the existence of this wage differential. The current 
trend has been to compare real wages instead of nominal wages 
between the north and the south. The argument is, simply, 
that individuals react to real earnings and not nominal 
earnings when choosing among alternative jobs. The major 
study testing this hypothesis was done by Coelho and Ghali 
(I97l). They regressed nominal wages and real wages on 
several control variables which included industry composi­
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tion between the two regions, race and sex variables, and 
a dummy variable (south = 1). The idea was then to test 
the size and significance of this dummy variable. They 
found that when nominal wages were used, the dummy variable 
was negative and significant and consistent with the wage 
differential that had been estimated in previous studies. 
However, when real wages were used, the size of this differ­
ential fell and became insignificant, thus supporting the 
hypothesis that real wages are equal between the two regions. 
Sellante (1979) supported Coelho and Ghali's (1971) study. 
Specifically, he determined that cost of living along with 
human capital characteristics like formal education, on the 
job training, and experience of labor between two regions 
explained the north-south wage differential. 
The newest development in the geographic wage differen­
tial literature has been to test for differences in ameni­
ties between regions as possible sources of regional differ­
entials. For example, Hanushek (I98l) uses measures of crime 
rates and climate (among other compensating variables) and 
regresses earnings on these. He finds both the crime rate 
and climate variables to be significant determinants of 
earnings. However, it should be noted that the major point 
of his study is to show that more research should be done 
on determining the structure of the models used to estimate 
geographic wage differentials. 
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The literature discussed above provides a background 
for border/noaborder wage differential studies. A second set 
of studies has focused on, the U.S.-Mexican border and pro­
vides important ideas for this study. Specifically, Ericson 
(1970), in studying the industrial structure of U.S. southern 
border cities, explains the different socioeconomic charac­
teristics (employment, population, and industrial mix) of 
each one of these border cities. This is important since it 
shows that border regions should be studied as a hetero­
geneous region, a point which becomes very relevant later 
in this thesis. 
Briggs (1975) has studied the characteristics of illegal 
aliens. And by analyzing these characteristics . (they are 
mostly male, young, and illiterate), it is possible to iso­
late similar subgroups among border residents which are more 
likely to be affected by illegal migration. The importance 
of this point also becomes relevant later in this thesis. 
The Smith and Newman (1977) study takes into account 
much of the progress of the geographic wage differential 
literature. This is evident by looking at their multiple 
regression analysis and noticing the control variables they 
used: race, sex, occupation, tenure, and cost of living. 
Nevertheless, there still remain important questions to be 
answered in the border/nonborder literature that have al­
ready been explored in other regional differential studies. 
13 
such as those being tested in this thesis and mentioned 
in the previous chapter. The objective of the following 
chapters is to attempt to answer some of these questions. 
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THEORY 
Economic theory suggests that, if costless information 
and mobility exist in a perfectly competitive market, real 
wage differentials between regions of similar labor should 
disappear. There are three independent mechanisms which 
would bring this about; interregional trade in goods, 
mobility of capital, and mobility of labor. Interregional 
trade in goods would bring about a real wage equality if some 
regions can produce a good at a lower cost relative to other 
regions. This cost reduction could be due to differences in 
wages among different places. If transportation costs did 
not fully offset these savings, it follows that individuals 
of other regions would purchase the good from the lower 
priced region, thereby increasing the demand for the good 
and increasing the demand for labor in this region also. 
This process would continue until real wages between the 
regions and the relative cost advantage between regions would 
be eliminated. 
Mobility of capital would occur since firms would want 
to take advantage of the cheaper resources of one region 
relative to another. An increase of capital in a region 
should have the effect of increasing the marginal product of 
labor and consequently increase the demand for labor. Some 
of this increase should be offset by a decrease in the 
product price, since output would expand as the input costs 
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go down. An extreme case would be when the decline in the 
product price offsets the increase in the marginal product. 
In the aggregate, however, as you sum up all labor demands 
in the defined region, the increase in capital should have 
the effect of increasing the demand for labor. Consequently, 
wages ^ fould be bid up in this region, a process which would 
again eliminate wage differentials among regions. 
There also would be a migration incentive for workers 
when a real wage differential exists between regions. 
Workers considering the present value of their expected re­
turns by migrating would match these with the costs of migra­
tion and, thus, would either decide to accept the higher 
paying job in another region or not. Again, this process 
would increase the supply of labor in the higher wage region 
and reduce it in the lower wage region until wage equality 
would be restored. 
This process, however, abstracts from regional special­
ization of production of goods and the fact that workers also 
value nonpecuniary advantages of a job. With specialization 
of production among regions, the second mechanism above is 
not effective since consumers can only buy goods from a par­
ticular region. This is not such a serious problem since 
the other two mechanisms would still eliminate the wage dif­
ferential. However, if individuals value nonpecuniary aspects 
of jobs, then it is possible to have a pecuniary wage differ­
16 
ential among regions. This is so for two reasons. First, 
workers vill not migrate if they believe that their pecuniary 
plus nonpecuniary benefits ars equal to any other region. 
Second, the assumption of perfect geographic mobility of 
firms is unrealistic even in the long-run. Some firms may 
have geographic specific resources in their production 
process or may need a "pool" of qualified labor -which may 
also be specific to only a select number of regions. 
The point is that, if due account is taken of these non-
pecuniary characteristics, geographic wage differentials 
should be eliminated in the long-run. To formalize this 
discussion, t-'vo models are presented. The first, Bradfield's 
(1976) model, sho-ws how compensation for workers should be 
equalized in the long-run. The difference between wages 
of similar labor can be due to either differences in effi­
ciency between labor of different regions and to nonpecuniary 
aspects of jobs as judged by -workers. The second model, the 
hedonic model, expands on the explanation of the wage differ­
entials attributable to nonpecunicary characteristics. Both 
models have relevant empirical implications for this thesis. 
For one, border/nonborder wage differentials can be due to 
differences in socioeconomic characteristics such as educa­
tion, age, and tenure. Also, distance from the border for 
Mexican-Americans may be an important nonpecuniary attribute 
to Mexican-American residents of the border. 
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The Bradfield Model 
This is an industry model where the production function 
is homogeneous of degree one. Both product and factor mar­
kets are assumed to be competitive: 
X = Px A 0°' (1) 
where; 
X = value added by industry 
Px = price received by the firm for its output 
A = neutral efficiency coefficient 
Q = CK, C being the efficiency coefficient of 
capital, K 
N = BL, B being the efficiency coefficient of labor, L. 
B also takes into account any nonpecuniary aspects 
of a job. 
Since the input markets are competitive, both labor and 
capital receive their value of marginal product; 
VMPk = rPk = âX/ôK = aPx A 8^"°" k^'"^ (2) 
where : 
r = rate of interest 
Pk = cost of capital 
k = K/L 
Solving for k, equation 2 can be rewritten as; 
k = (rPk/aPx A C°" (l/a-l) (3) 
VMPL = W = ÔX/ÔL = (1-a) Px AC°' B^""' kf^ (4) 
w = (1-a) (PxA)(^ '^  ^°')(rPx)(^ °^^ "^ )c(°'^  ^^ '^ B (5) 
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If a comparison, is made between the wages of two re­
gions, say regions i and j, then the ratio of 5 between these 
two regions shows the factors that account for this differenr 
tial; 
Wij = (Pxij (rij Pxi j) Ci 
( 6 )  
Now, if the following assumptions are made: 
(a) Product prices are the same for the two regions 
(a reasonable assumption since goods are usually 
produced for a national market, making these the 
same for consumers of all regions); 
(b) Interest rates are the same for the two regions 
(financial markets provide a consistent interest 
rate for all regions; if not, then individuals would 
lend or borrow money in the region which is more 
competitive for them); 
(c) Efficiency of capital and technology is the same 
for the two regions (capital is bought in a national 
market making all firms equally competitive in this 
regard); 
then equation 6 reduces to : 
Wij = Bij (7) 
Equation 7 thus indicates the pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
reasons why wages may be different between regions i and j. 
In the case of the border and nonborder regions, this model 
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suggests that efficiency characteristics such as education 
and experience are important explanatory variables in this 
wage differential. It also suggests that amenities of the 
two areas also are important characteristics which should be 
taken into account in a study of the wage differential be­
tween the two areas. 
The Hedonic Model 
As mentioned in the introduction, Adam Smith (1973) was 
the first to introduce the idea of compensating wage differ­
entials into economic thought. He described how jobs with 
different characteristics would receive different wages. 
Among the characteristics he mentioned is agreeableness of 
the job. In short, individuals with more agreeable jobs will 
accept lower paying jobs, other things equal, than those with 
less agreeable jobs. 
Contemporary economists have developed the hedonic 
model to convey this idea of compensating wage differen­
tials (see, for example, Ehrenberg and Smith, 1982). The 
assumptions of the model are three. First, workers seek to 
maximize their utility and not their income when choosing 
among alternative jobs; likewise, firms attempt to maximize 
their profits. Second, both workers and firms have perfect 
information. Third, workers are perfectly mobile enough to 
change jobs if they consider that a new job can attain a 
20 
higher utility level. 
Workers' side of the market 
The hedonic model is applicable to any nonpecuniary 
aspect. But the underlying idea behind the hedonic model, 
in the context of this thesis, is that some Mexican-American 
individuals dislike the idea of living away from the border. 
Living close to the border means that they are closer to 
their cultural heritage—Mexico. In order for these workers 
to remain at the same level of utility and live away from the 
border, they would have to be compensated with higher wages. 
Using graphical analysis, indifference curves can be used to 
trace combinations of wages and distance from the border 
which yield the same level of utility. 
The indifference curves should be drawn to show that 
distance from the border is a "bad" and that wages are a 
"good"; and; also, that their slops reflects a diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution between distance and wages. 
This means that the first miles away from the border can 
easily be compensated with small increments in wages; however, 
as distance increases, greater increments of wages must be 
obtained in order for the worker to remain at the same level 
of utility. Indifference curves such as the ones presented 
in Figure 1 fill these requirements. 
As shown in Figure 1, U2 represents a higher level of 
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Figure 1. Indifference curves (distance/wages space) 
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utility than U1. This is so since at the same distance from 
the border (Dl) the -worker can attain higher wages at U2 
(W2) than at Ui (Wl). Also, the slope of U1 and U2 shows 
that greater increases in wages must be obtained by the 
worker the farther away he is from the border, i.e., 
D3 - D2 = D4 - D3, but W4 - W3 > W3 - W2. 
Different indifference curves can be drawn for different 
individuals. This can be done by noting that some individuals 
differ as to their aversion to distance. The following cases 
are considered in Figure 2. 
There are three individuals. A, B; and C, who have dif­
ferent aversions to distance from the border. A is more 
distance averse than B. B is more distance averse than C. 
This can be proved by looking at Figure 2. To move D2-D1 
miles away from the border, individual A requires W3-W1 more 
in wages compared to W2-W1 which B requires (C is "distance 
neutral"—he requires no change in wages). It is obvious 
from Figure 2 that W3 - Wl > W2 - Wl. 
Firm's side of the market 
On the firm's side of the market, there also are economic 
forces which show a trade-off between wages and distance from 
the border. The hedonic model incorporates firm behavior by 
using isoprofit curves. An isoprofit curve, in this particu­
lar case, is a locus of combinations between wages and dis­
tance from the border which shows the same level of profit 
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Figure 2. Different degrees of aversity to distance of 
individuals 
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for a firm. Given the assumption of zero long-run profits 
under perfect competition, the relevant isoprofit curve at 
"which the firm will operate is that of zero profits. 
For simplicity, two types of firms are considered here. 
One firm has no long-run costs in locating. The other does 
have long-run location costs. 
The isoprofit curves, on the wages-distance space, of 
the first firm would be totally horizontal. Since moving 
to the border region does not create long-run costs to this 
firm, it need not lower wages to border workers to remain at 
the same profit level. In the long-run, this type of firm 
will offer the same wage rate in every region. Graphically, 
the isoprofit curves would look like those in Figure 3. 
The other type of firm, having location costs, does have 
a trade-off between wages and distance. The source of these 
costs are two. First, there are costs due to specialized 
labor in the production process. Locating close to the 
border area would increase these costs since firms would have 
to recruit this labor (assuming firms cannot meet their labor 
needs in the border). These increased costs would have to be 
offset by lower wage offers to border workers to remain at 
the same profit level. Second, there are also costs due to 
fixed natural resources in production; for example, a mining 
firm. Since, for instance, it is costly for this type of 
firm to locate in regions of low-grade mining, it must also 
reduce job offers to border residents as in the case before. 
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Figure 3. The isoprofit curve of a firm with no location 
costs 
The isoprofit curves for this type of a firm look as 
those presented in Figure 4. Isoprofit curves that lie 
above the zero isoprofit curve have profits less than zero 
since wages are higher at every distance from the border. 
Isoprofit curves that lie belov the zero isoprofit curve 
have profits greater than zero since wages are lower at 
every distance from the border. 
The shape of the isoprofit curve for this type of firm 
reflects the increasing marginal cost of reducing distance 
by an additional unit of distance—say a mile. Specifically, 
the first miles of reduction in distance would entail small 
marginal costs and, thus, the reduction in wage offers is 
small. Consequently, for the firm, every mile reduced can 
only be attained at greater reduction of wages, i.e., 
D3 - D2 = D2 - Dl, but W2 - W1 > W3 - W2. 
Generalizing, there will be firms that have different 
mobility costs depending on their production process. Conse­
quently, some firms will have greater marginal costs than 
others in locating close to the border. Consider three firms 
X, Y, and Z in Figure 5. 
Firm X has greater relocation marginal costs than the 
other two firms. Firm Z has no location costs and thus its 
marginal costs are equal to zero. Firm X thus has to offer 
a greater reduction in wages (W3 - W1 > W2 - wi) than does 
Firm Y. 
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Figure 4. The isoprofit curves of a firm with location 
costs 
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Figure 5. Different location costs of firms 
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Matching of workers and firms 
The goal of workers is to maximize utility. However, 
they are constrained by the offers made by firms. Firms 
seek also to maximize profits, being also constrained by 
two forces. First, they cannot make too lucrative wage 
offers since these would entail higher costs and thus lower 
profits. Second, if their wage offers are too low, workers 
•would simply not be attracted to these jobs. Graphically, 
the relevant "offer curve" for the worker and firm is the 
darker line of Figure 5. 
It follows that workers maximizing their utility will 
only agree to work for the firm that offers the highest wage 
for a given distance from the border. 
Combining workers and firms in the same distance/wage 
space, individuals with preferences similar to A's will work 
for firm Y at Dy, Wy. Likewise, individuals with preferences 
similar to B's will work for firm X at Dx, Wx. The compen­
sating wage differential for individual B for being Dx-Dy 
miles farther from the border is then Wx-Wy. 
Predictions from the model 
This model gives a theoretical prediction that one im­
portant source of the wage differential among Mexican-
Americans, after controlling for all other possible sources, 
in the border and nonborder regions is distance from the 
border. Mexican-Americans thus accept jobs in different 
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Figure 6. Matching workers with firms 
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firms by considering how far these are from the border. 
Those with high preferences (Type A individuals) for the 
border will locate close to the border at a lower wage than 
those that have a low preference (Type B individuals). This 
wage differential thus represents (Wx-Wy), a compensating 
wage differential to being closer to the border (Dx-Dy). 
It should be noted that distance from the border may 
not be the only locational consideration for Mexican-
Americans. They may also be attracted to regions which have 
high concentration levels of Mexican-Americans. In this 
event, the analysis above still applies, since Mexican-
Americans value the closeness of "their own people" much 
in the same way as they do distance from the border. A test 
of this possibility is considered in the empirical chapter 
of this thesis. 
It should also be noted that other amenities may be 
present in the border such as a more favorable climate or 
possible lower crime rates. The analysis of these two vari­
ables follow the same idea as above. These two are briefly 
considered in the empirical section of this thesis also. 
Referring to Figure 5, there is an implication that only 
Z type firms will locate in the border area, in the inter­
mediate run. These firms, as mentioned before, ^  not re­
quire either specialized labor or capital, symptomatic of 
firms which are low skill labor intensive. Firms of this 
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type will tend to locate closer to this pool of unskilled 
labor near the border, while the more capital specialized 
intensive firms will locate outside the border area. In the 
long-run, Mexican-Americans will have an incentive to upgrade 
their education. Hence, in the long-run, firms which require 
more highly trained labor will find it advantageous to lo­
cate in the border area. 
It should be stressed, however, that the period of time 
for educational advancement could take generations. Thus, 
it is still of interest to empirically study the predictions 
of wages and distance of the hedonic model for the border 
region. 
In summary, this theoretical analysis suggests that any 
empirical analysis of geographic wage differentials should 
consider both pecuniary and nonpecuniary variables. The 
next chapter deals with testing these theoretical results 
with multiple-regression analysis. 
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PROCEDURE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The major data source used in this study is the l/lOOO 
Public Use Sample (PUS) data of the 1970 Census of Popula­
tion. It is convenient at this point to mention the major 
advantage and disadvantage of using this data set (other 
data sources are discussed later in this chapter). 
The advantage is that it contains a variety of socio­
economic characteristics, along with an annual earnings mea­
sure, for each individual in the sample. This is advan­
tageous since it is possible to test, using multiple-
regression analysis, the effect of the border/nonborder wage 
differential when some of these characteristics are used as 
control variables. 
The disadvantage, however, is that only annual earnings 
are available rather than hourly or weekly earnings. This 
is a problem since workers' annual earnings could be differ­
ent between individuals due to a difference in hours worked 
per week and weeks worked per year. This problem is identi­
cal to that faced by Smith and Newman (1977) in their study, 
as mentioned in chapter 1. And as mentioned i n chapter 1, 
they used controls for hours worked per week and weeks 
TOrked per year in their multiple regression model. The 
problem with doing this, however, is that the PUS measure of 
annual earnings, as well as weeks worked per year, are for 
the year of 1959. But the measure of hours worked per week 
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is for the census week of 1970. To use these data, an 
assumption that has to be made is that individuals in the 
sample worked approximately the same number of hours in 1969 
as they did in 1970. This, however, is not a crucial assump­
tion for the results obtained in this thesis since this mea­
sure is only used as a control variable. 
It is also important to note at the outset two addi­
tional points about the data. First, the annual earnings 
measure includes earnings from wages, salary commissions, 
bonuses, or tips from all jobs and excludes earnings from non-
farm business, professional practice or partnership, farm 
business, income from social security or railroad retirement, 
and public assistance or welfare. Second, the data were re­
duced to 1149 observations which included observations from 
five southwestern states; Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Cali­
fornia, and Colorado (see Appendix A for a listing of these 
SMSAS). The reduction was done to save computing costs. In 
doing so, only employed males, heads of household, were 
chosen. This was done to avoid any biases in the results 
that may have occurred by including secondary workers such as 
females or teenagers. In addition, rather than just take a 
random sample, I used all of the Mexican-Americans in order 
to have the largest possible number of observations of this 
group. A comparable number of non-Mexican-Americans was 
chosen. This was done by randomly selecting individuals from 
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this group (using a random identification number at the be­
ginning of each observation) and then matching as closely 
as possible the occupations of this group to that of Mexican-
Americans. 
To test the two major hypotheses of this thesis, this 
chapter is divided into two parts. First l ask. Is there a 
U.S./Mexico, border/nonborder wage differential? Second, 
Are compensating wage differentials important in the wage 
structure of Mexican-Americans? 
Is There a U.S./Mexico, Border/Nonborder 
Wage Differential? 
Looking at the mean annual earnings between the two regions 
Table 1 shows the mean annual earnings between the 
border and nonborder regions for the aggregate data as well 
as the same data broken into two regional areas, east and 
west, and between Mexican and non-Mexican-Americans.^ The 
rationale for comparing ineans is that these provide first 
approximations of actual differentials which may exist be­
tween regions and races. It also serves as a base for inter­
preting the differentials estimated by using multiple re­
gression analysis. 
^The west region includes only California SMSAS while 
the east region includes the SMSAs of the other four states. 
This division was made to separate the San Diego border SMSA 
from the other SMSAs due to its different size relative 
to these other border SMSAs. A listing of these SMSAs is 
in Appendix A. 
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Table 1. Border/nonborder mean earnings^ 
Border Nonborder 
(WB) (WN) (WN-WB)/WB 
Nominal earnings 
All data $8785(246)^ $9470(903) .0780 
East 7338 (94) 9156(445) .2478 
West 9713(152) 9879(458) .0171 
Mexican-American 5164 (73) 6642(368) .2862 
East 4704 (56) 6196(141) .3163 
West 6671 (17) 6920(227) .0373 
Non-Mexican-American 9807(173) 9771(535) -.0004 
East 9405 (38) 9431(304) .0003 
West 9920(135) 10217(231) .0299 
Real earnings 
All data 9104(246) 9343(903) .0263 
East 8304 (94) 9380(445) .1296 
West 9732(152) 9305(458) -.0439 
Mexican-American 5684 (73) 6453(368) .1353 
East 5385 (56) 6304(141) .1707 
West 6671 (17) 6546(227) -.0187 
Non-Mexican-American 10070(173) 9650(535) -.0417 
East 10600 (38) 9680(304) -.0868 
West 9920(135) 9620(231) -.0302 
^The aggregate mean nisasures vsre estimated as follows: 
Aggregate Mean Earnings = Non-Mexican-American Mean Earnings 
X (MA) + Non-Mexican-American Mean Earnings x (1-MA); where 
i = All Data, East and West. The MA variable is the percent 
Mexican-American for each SMSA. This was obtained from 1970 
Census Reports (1970a,b) by considering only male Mexican-
Americans in the labor force. A weighted average was then 
used to estimate this percentage by the regions defined above, 
by taking into account different population sizes of SMSAs. 
This procedure had to be used since the sample of this 
thesis, as mentioned in the text above, oversamples the 
number of Mexican-Americans in each region. 
^The number in parentheses represents number of indi­
viduals in each division. 
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Specifically, Table 1 shows the nominal earnings dif­
ferentials. There are several points of interest here. 
First, when the aggregate border/nonborder comparison is 
made, a 7.8% differential is found. But this differential 
can, for the most part, be attributed to a 22.8% differen­
tial found in the east compared to only a 1.71% differential 
found in the west. Second, this differential is greater for 
all divisions of Mexican-Americans relative to non-Moxican-
Americans. And, for the Mexican-American group, the east, 
differential is, ds above, much larger than that found for 
the west. In addition, for the non-Mexican-American group, 
there is little or no differential when the aggregate differ­
ential is estimated. The wage differential is essentially 
zero in the east while it is small (2.99%) in the west. 
From Table 1, implications could be drawn (much like 
those made by other border studies mentioned in the review 
of literature chapter). Specifically, this differential can 
be due to the depressing effects of legal and illegal Mexican 
labor on the border region. If so, it appears that Mexican-
Americans are the most affected by this entry. We may also 
note that these differentials fail to control for cost of 
living differences. 
To explore this possibility. Table 1 also shows these 
same differentials but using real rather than nominal earn­
ings. The procedure here was to divide nominal earnings by 
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a cost of living measure.^ This, as expected, provides us 
with different results. First, the differential between the 
border and nonborder regions falls to 2.5% when the aggregate 
data are used. Second, non-Mexican-American real earnings 
are actually higher along the border than in the nonborder 
region, while the border/nonborder real earning differentials 
of Mexican-Americans fall relative to the comparable nominal 
earnings differential. By region, the real earnings differ­
entials also fall relative to the nominal earnings differen­
tials. 
The difference in results found by using real rather 
than nominal earnings suggests that there are other possible 
sources of this earnings differential. More importantly, 
implications drawn from mean differentials may be mis­
leading. It does, however, suggest that the eastern region 
has lower annual earnings than the west. It also suggests 
that Mexican-Americans possibly have greater wage differen­
tials than do non-Mexican-Americans. The next step is to 
submit these data to a more rigorous investigation. 
^These were obtained from Liu (1974). The advantage of 
this data source is that it provides a consistent set of 
cost of living measures with the SMSAs of the 1970 Census. 
The disadvantage is that some of these are estimates. Liu 
estimated living costs for cities not surveyed by taking 
either the cost of living of neighboring SMSAs or by comput­
ing regional averages of similar sized SMSAs from that area. 
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Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics^ 
A better approach to analyzing the border/nonborder 
differential is to control for socioeconomic characteristics. 
This enables us to isolate effects which are not specific to 
a region and which bias the differential obtained with the 
means approach above. In doing so, a convenient technique 
to use is multiple regression analysis. And since the PUS 
data contain a wide variety of characteristics, it is possi­
ble to regress annual earnings on these characteristics, 
after controlling for hours worked in a week and weeks worked 
in a year. 
This part presents such analyses. Two general models 
are presented. One uses nominal earnings and the other real 
earnings as dependent variables. Table 2a contains a list of 
abbreviations used in the regression tables in this thesis. 
Before presenting the analyses, it should be noted that 
the multiple regression analyses follow the basic model of 
Smith and Newman (1977). After controlling for relevant 
socioeconomic characteristics, a border/nonborder dummy vari­
able is used to estimate this wage differential. The results 
are compared to those of Smith and Newman, where applicable, 
^In the analysis that follows, there is a potential prob­
lem with using HOURS AND WEEKS WORKED as a control variable. 
This variable can be considered as an endogenous variable 
since individuals consider earnings to determine their hours 
supplied to the labor market. This also is a problem with the 
INDUSTRY and OCCUPATION control variables since these can also 
be seen as being endogenously determined. Future research 
should address this problem. 
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Table 2a. List of abbreviations used in the regression 
tables 
Abbreviation Explanation 
INT Intercept 
BOR Border 
MAR Not married 
HRS Hours vorked 
WKS Weeks worked 
El 7 years or less of education 
E2 7 to 8 years of education 
E3 9 to 11 years of education 
E4 13 to 16 years of education 
E5 17 years of education 
E6 More than 17 years of education 
EM E2 + E3 
EN E4 + E5 + E5 
01 Professional, technical and kindred workers 
02 Managers and administrators, except farm 
03 Sales workers 
04 Clerical and kindred workers 
05 Craftsmen and kindred workers 
05 Operators, except transport 
07 Transport equipment operators 
08 Farmers, farm laborers and farm foremen 
09 Service workers 
010 Private household workers 
11 Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
12 Mining 
13 Construction 
14 Manufacturing 
15 Transportation; comm.unications, and other 
public utilities 
I5 Wholesale trade 
17 Retail trade 
18 Finance, insurance and real estate 
19 Services 
110 Professional services 
OH 01 + 02 
OW 03 + 04 
EX Experience 
EXl EX^ 
BL Black 
ME Mexican-American 
CP Cost of living index 
MAP Percent Mexican-Americans 
DIST Dist3nce from the border 
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Nominal earnings.' This regression model has the fol­
lowing form; 
li = f(BORDER;UNMARRIED; EDUCATION;OCCUPATION;INDUSTRY; 
EXPERIENCE ;RACE;HOURS WORKED;WEEKS WORKED) (1) 
where li are annual nominal earnings for each individual in 
the sample. All of the variables used in this model are 
dummy variables except for EXPERIENCE, HOURS WORKED, and 
WEEKS WORKED which are continuous variables. 
The UNMARRIED variable controls for the lower annual 
earnings generally found for individuals who are not married. 
The expected sign of this variable is negative since, in the 
following tests, unmarried individuals have a dummy variable 
equal to 1. 
There was a choice between using the EDUCATION variable 
as a continuous variable or a set of dummy variables. The 
latter was chosen since additional years of education may 
have different effects on earnings depending on the level of 
schooling. For exaraple, an additional four years in college 
may have a different marginal effect than four years in high 
school. Consequently, the EDUCATION variable is divided into 
seven categories (see Table 2a^). But this division is not 
ideal when race and geographic region divisions are made, 
since some categories do not have very many observations. 
This makes the statistical results for the category with 
^Table 2a does not include the deleted category. The 
deleted category for this, and for the other references later 
in this chapter, are mentioned in the body of this chapter. 
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insufficient observations subject to large sampling errors 
and difficult to interpret. Therefore, only four categories 
are used when subdivisions are made (see Table 2a). These 
subdivisions were defined with two things in mind: that 
each category had more than 15 observations and/or that the 
same categories were chosen for all subdivisions. 
Another important control is the occupation of an indi­
vidual (the occupations selected are two digit code occupa­
tions). Occupations vary in skill and possess different com­
pensating characteristics (for example, risk levels). This 
leads to earnings differentials among occupations. In these 
tests, the OCCUPATION variable presented the same problem as 
did the EDUCATION variable when subdivisions were made. In 
this case, the solution was to reduce the categories for this 
characteristic from ten to four (see Table 2a). The rationale 
for this aggregation was based on the reasons mentioned above 
for EDUCATION and also on the fact that these divisions proved 
to be convenient for data manageability, when analyzing com­
pensating differentials later in this chapter. 
And just as occupational categories lead to different 
average earnings, the industry in which an individual works 
is also an important consideration in earnings differentials. 
It was decided, in this case, to use the two digit code 
industrial classifications as provided in the PUS data for 
the INDUSTRY variables. This was done since it was difficult 
to create broader categories with the eleven that were 
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originally selected. And though some of the results may be 
misleading due to the small sample size, it was judged that 
this set of variables was important to control for effects 
that the other variables did not pick up. For example, two 
individuals may work in the same occupation but in .different 
industries and have different earnings. This could be due, 
again, to compensating differentials. 
Three races are distinguished: Anglo, Black (Dummy = 1, 
0 otherwise), and Mexican-American (Dummy =1,0 otherwise). 
The rationale for making these divisions, in this context, 
is to identify the effect of discrimination on earnings. 
These controls are used where applicable. Specifically, 
when running the aggregate sample, it was necessary to include 
both the Black and Mexican-American dummy variables. But 
when running the non-Mexican-American sample, only the Black 
variable was entered. 
The EXPERIENCE variable (Age - Number of schooling 
years - 5) is used in a quadratic form. This was done to 
capture the effect of diminishing returns of additional earn­
ings due to additional years of experience. If this hy­
pothesis is true, then the linear term should be positive 
and the squared term should be negative. 
Finally, as explained before, HOURS WORKED and WEEKS 
WORKED are entered due to the fact that I only have data on 
annual earnings. A problem with annual earnings is likely 
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if some individuals, on average, work more hours a week 
and/or more weeks a year than other individuals, other 
things equal. 
Table 2b shows the regressions estimated using the 
appregate data for all races and both regions. The first 
thing to note is the border variable in column 1. This 
says that after controlling for the socioeconomic character­
istics of model 1, border residents earn, on average, ap­
proximately $500 less than nonborder residents. This is a 
5.5% differential using nonborder means as a base. 
When compared to the 20% differential Smith and Newman 
(1977) estimated for nominal earnings, this differential 
shows a marked reduction. This suggests that my broader 
selection of border and nonborder regions, as well as the 
differing sizes of these regions, is an improvement over 
Smith and Newman's limited sample. 
Another important point here is that the border variable 
loses its statistical significance. This raises questions 
of the existence of this differential in the first place. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2b suggest some interesting 
results as well. Smith and Newman did a test on the hetero­
geneity of the border region by comparing earnings of the 
three border regions to Houston. They found these differen­
tials to be different and concluded that "There are likely 
to be substantial differences between areas along the U.S.-
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Table 2b. Mexican-American and non-Mexican-American nominal 
earnings^ 
Vari­
able DF 
All data East West 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
INT 1 14.58 1.36 13.96 0.87 11.15 0.76 
BOR 1 -5.00 -1.46 -8,90 -1.50 -0.79 -0.18 
MAR 1 -13.97 -2.96** -24.77 -2.96** -9.69 -1.75 
HRS 1 0.47 0.45 1.66 1.01 1.15 0.85 
WKS 1 7.40 5.48** 5.93 2.61** 8.48 5.17** 
El 1 -22.79 -4.57** -27.04 -3.41** -11.90 -1.86* 
E2 1 -16,00 -2.59** -24.04 -2.50* - 4 . 8 4  -0. 61 
E3 1 -11.88 -2.78** -12.97 -1.91 -7.59 -1.40 
E4 1 5.60 1.34 1.86 0.27 6.98 1.38 
E5 1 44.33 4.77** 64.88 4.47** 24.41 -2.06* 
E6 1 62.07 7.16** 55.01 4,02** 69.58 6.40** 
01 1 28.95 3.79** 28.24 2.41** 29.24 -2.86* 
02 1 25.75 3.71** 32.19 3.13:':* 20,03 -2.09* 
03 1 5.29 0.64 22,99 1. 84 -12.15 -1.09 
04 1 -1.75 -0.23 0.09 0.01 -2.73 -0.24 
05 1 4.34 0.71 4.01 0.45 3.41 0.40 
06 1 3.94 0.58 5.65 0.54 0.82 0.09 
07 1 0.61 0.08 -1,89 -0.18 1.29 0.12 
08 1 -9.17 -0.89 -5,85 -0.36 -16.64 -1.21 
09 1 -5.67 -0.75 -10.79 -0.94 -3.72 -0.38 
EX 1 2.97 8. 85** 2.96 5.74** 2.88 6.54** 
EXl 1 -0.05 -7.46** -0.04 -4.78** -0.05 -5.54** 
12 1 6.89 0.55 5.25 0.33 24.36 0.95 
13 1 9.96 1.51 5.58 0.65 11.79 1.37 
14 1 8.30 1.42 8.23 0.92 4.47 0 . 5 8  
15 T_ 8.78 1.34 -4.58 -0.4S 2 5 . 8 8  2.89** 
16 1 6.76 0.93 5.74 0.53 6.06 0.63 
17 1 3.43 0.54 -2.22 -0.23 5.15 0.62 
18 1 16.09 -1.74* 15.97 1.13 12.52 1,04 
19 1 -1.68 -0.24 9.80 0.94 -15.04 -1.65* 
IlO 1 -10.98 -1.46 3.29 0.27 -20.96 -2.21* 
ME 1 -13.97 -4.13** -14.27 -2.65** -13.74 -3.08** 
BL 1 -28.63 -4.05** -28.10 -2.98** -25.77 -2.31* 
.364 .396 .398 
N 1149 539 610 
^All coefficients should be interpreted in hundreds of 
dollars in this table and Tables 3 through 8. 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Mexican border.... A regional development program designed 
to solve this problem -which exists in. this area should seri­
ously consider this fact" (Smith and Newman, 1977, p. 59). 
Since their test only includes Texas border SMSAs, it was 
of interest to see if a broader set which includes more 
SMSAs (such as that of this thesis) along the border region 
gave the same results. 
In column 2, the east differential is $890 while the 
west differential is $^9. These results show a large dif­
ference, supporting Smith and Newman's statement that border 
regions are different and that due account should be taken of 
this fact. 
However, two important points should be made here. 
First, both of these coefficients are statistically insig­
nificant, raising questiop.s as to the existence of any wage 
differentials. Second, there is only one border region in 
the west sample, San Diego, California. The relative size 
of San Diego compared to the SMSAs of the western region 
may have biased these results. But other similar sized 
SMSAs were also chosen in the nonborder sample such as 
San Francisco and Los Angelas, California, minimizing this 
possibility. 
Tables 3 and 4 separate the data into two racial groups : 
Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-Americans. This subdivi­
sion was made to test which of the two groups is affected 
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Table 3. Non-Mexican-American nominal earnings 
All data East West Var-
able DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
INT 1 3.33 0.22 -11.97 -0.49 11.72 0.57 
BOR 1 -2.42 -0.49 -2.70 -0.26 -3.00 -0.52 
MAR 1 -17.21 -2.21* -24.42 ~1 92 -12.42 -1.27 
HRS 1 -1.76 -1.12 0.01 o'.oo -0.74 -0.35 
WKS 1 8.68 3.80** 6.83 1.81* 8.75 3.04** 
05 1 7.41 1.21 11.88 1.30 1.67 0.20 
OH 1 36.61 5.98** 44.61 4.75** 3 2 . 3 0  4.02** 
OW 1 2.96 0.40 23.12 1.95* -11.00 -1.19 
EX 1 3.94 7.71** 4.29 5.70** 3.88 5.46** 
EXl 1 -0.07 -6.89** -0.07 -4.82** -0.07 -5.09** 
11 1 -21.52 -1.02 -1.11 -0,04 -41.37 -1.46 
12 1 13.00 0.84 14.75 0.78 2 5 . 2 8  0.80 
13 1 8.71 0.85 15.23 0.98 5.42 0.40 
14 1 14.42 1.69 21.86 1.75* 6.45 0.56 
15 1 13.72 1.43 0.45 0.03 30.42 2.30* 
16 1 17.93 1.70* 22.08 1.42 9.17 0.65 
17 1 8.08 0.85 4.76 0.33 5.81 0.46 
18 1 29.45 2.34- 37.25 1.95* 14.57 0.87 
19 1 4.80 0.45 22.15 1.47 -16.65 -1.08 
110 1 -1.29 -0.12 26.15 1.41 -17.74 -1.31 
El 1 -14.20 -1.50 -30.97 -2.32* 14.77 1.02 
EM 1 -13.36 -2.20* -20.24 -2.21* -1.94 -0.24 
EN 1 11.95 2.17* 10.31 1,18 12.31 1.77* 
BL 1 -28.36 -3.29** -23.86 -2.07* -35.19 -2.58** 
R2 
.274 . 320 , 303 
N 708 342 366 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Mexican-American nominal earnings 
Vari­
able DF 
All data East West 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
INT 1 6.69 0.70 15.07 0.96 -3.65 -0.29 
BOR 1 -11.04 -2.76** -9.83 -1.82* 0.83 0.12 
MAR 1 -12.78 -2.86** -29.34 -3.35** -8.55 -1.76* 
HRS 1 2.51 -2.26* 3.44 1.90* 2.19 1.59 
WKS 1 6.45 5.16** 5.92 2.72** 7.34 4.92** 
05 1 3.31 0.87 -2.00 -0.31 8.29 1.84* 
OH 1 23.99 4.83** 31.80 3.85** 19.16 3.08** 
OW 1 0.14 0.03 -2.66 -0.31 8.06 1.14 
EX 1 1.57 4.31** 0.46 0.74 2.12 4.87** 
EXl 1 -0.02 -3.35** -0.01 -0.56 -0.03 -3.48** 
13 1 15.09 -2.29* 4.63 0.49 23.04 -2.54* 
14 1 11.17 1.91* 11.86 1.32 10.22 1.24 
15 1 4.64 0.66 -2.39 -0.24 15.58 1.51 
16 1 -0.64 -0.08 -7.01 -0.60 7.58 0.70 
17 1 -0.10 -0.02 -0.57 -0.06 -2.55 -0.28 
IB 1 -0.65 -0.05 0.83 0.05 2.24 0.13 
19 1 -3.24 -0.45 1.27 0.11 -7.15 -0.77 
110 1 3.89 0.46 -9.12 -0.75 19.55 1.67* 
11 1 -5.88 -0.77 -10.14 -0.85 -3.02 -0.29 
El 1 -19.53 -4.22** -10.12 -1.22 -20.57 -3.83** 
EM 1 -5.18 -1.20 -1.16 -0.15 -7.02 -1.43 
EN 1 18.05 3.27** 12.42 1.23 21.20 3.44** 
R2  
.352 .354 .451 
197 244 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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the most by this wage differential. One hypothesis is that 
Mexican-Americans are more adversely affected by Mexican 
migration than are non-Mexican-Americans, since illegal 
aliens compete for jobs against this group the most. The 
other hypothesis is that the Mexican-American group values 
this proximity to the border more than the non-Mexican-
American group. And that is the subject of part 3 of this 
chapter. 
Column 1 of Tables 3 and 4 (3 for non-Mexican-Americans 
and 4 for Mexican-Americans) has the border/nonborder dif­
ferential for these two racial groups. This column suggests 
a differential of $1,104 for Mexican-Americans and only a 
$242 differential for non-Mexican-Americans. Furthermore, 
the coefficient of the Mexican-American group is significant 
at the 5% level while that of the non-Mexican-American group 
is not statistically significant. This suggests that Mexican-
Americans are more adversely affected by this wage differ­
ential. Again, this idea is pursued further in part 3 of 
this chapter. 
By looking at the remaining two columns of Tables 3 and 
4, it is possible to investigate whether these wage differ­
entials are the same in each region for each racial group. 
Table 4, column 2, shows that Mexican-Americans from the 
east are the ones with the greatest wage differential rela­
tive to the wage differential for Mexican-Americans in the 
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west which is a positive wage differential (Mexican-
Americans along the western border earn more than Mexican-
Americans in the nonbcrder western region). The former is 
significant at the lO^o level while the latter is insignifi­
cant. Non-Mexican-Americans, both east and west, have 
approximately the same differential ($270 east and $300 
west), but both are statistically insignificant. 
The conclusion from this analysis is clears The 
Mexican-American group, in general, has depressed nominal 
earnings along the border, but this is largely due to the 
eastern border effect as evidenced by the lack of a differ­
ential for Mexican-Americans in the west. The non-Mexican 
American group shows no significant wage differential. 
Smith and Newman's (1977) comparable analysis is presented 
in real earnings; therefore, the comparisons between the 
numbers of this thesis and their results are discussed in 
the section which follows. 
Real earnings In the review of literature chapter, 
it was shown that Coelho and Ghali (1971) and Sellante (1979) 
were among the first to test geographic wage differentials 
using real rather than nominal earnings. Their rationale 
was that workers attempt to maximize their real purchasing 
power when choosing among alternative jobs. Their tests were 
done between the north and south regions and they concluded 
that there was no evidence of a differential. Smith and 
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Newman (1977) did a similar test for the border/nonborder 
differential. However, though this differential narrowed 
(thus consistent with this hypothesis), it did not disappear. 
To test the real versus nominal hypothesis using the 
data of this thesis, the same tests done for nominal earn­
ings were performed here. Two models were used. 
The first model, model 2, is similar to model 1 with 
the only exception that the dependent variable is l/P or 
real earnings, rather than I, nominal earnings. P is the 
cost of living measure used in the means approach above. 
Specifically, 
l/P = f(X) (2) 
where X includes the variables of model 1. 
The second model controls for cost of living as an 
explanatory variable. Specifically, 
I - f(Xi?) (3) 
where X and P are as defined in model 2, 
For the aggregate data as well as for the regional di­
visions, east and west, the results of model 1 are presented 
in Table 5 and the results of model 2 are in Table 5. In col­
umn 1 of both of these tables, we can see that the estimate 
of the BORDER earnings differential for the aggregate data 
is small and insignificant. This suggests that there is no 
real earnings differential between the border and nonborder 
regions when socioeconomic characteristics are controlled for. 
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Table 5. Mexican -Americans and non-Mexican-Americans real 
earnings (Model 2) 
All data East We s it Vari­
able DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) ( 2 )  (3) 
INT 1 11.64 1.09 10.13 0.61 9.33 0.67 
BOR 1 -0.34 -0.10 -1.58 -0.26 4.65 1.12 
MAR 1 -14.88 -3.16** -26.07 -3.00** -9.36 -1.78* 
HRS 1 0.95 0.91 2.25 1.32 1.09 0.85 
WKS i_ 7.42 5.52** 5.99 2.54* ,8.19 5.24** 
El 1 -20.48 -4.12** -26.83 -3.26** -11.14 -1.83* 
E2 1 -14.30 -2.32* -22.99 -2.30* -4.45 -0.59 
E3 1 -10.04 -2.36* -12.09 -1.72* -6,68 -1.30 
E4 1 5.73 1.38 3.10 0.43 6.92 1.44 
E5 1 42.75 4.61** 62.12 4.12** 22.57 2.00** 
E6 1 63.08 7.30** 57.35 4.04** 6 8 . 8 1  6.66** 
01 1 27.21 3.58** 29.36 2.41* 25.48 2 . 6 2 * *  
02 1 24.98 3.61** 29.93 2.82** 19.95 2.12* 
03 1 6.25 0.76 23.46 1. 84* -11.85 -1.12 
04 1 -2.64 -0.34 0.70 0.05 -3.57 -0.37 
05 1 3.95 0.65 4.09 0.44 3.18 0.39 
06 1 4.02 0.59 7.02 0.65 0.74 0.08 
07 1 0.99 0.14 -1.12 -0.11 1. 85 0.19 
08 1 -9.46 -0.92 -7.14 -0.45 -13.11 -1.00 
09 1 -7.05 -0.94 -13.09 -1.09 -3.96 —0.42 ** 
EX 1 2.98 8.91** 3.21 5.99** 2.75 6 . 5 8 * *  
EXl 1 -0.05 -7.55** -0.05 -5.00** -0.04 -5.58** 
12 1 14.66 1.17 9.78 0.60 28.05 1.15 
13 1 8.62 1,31 6.40 0.61 10.91 1.33 
14 1 6 . 2 2  1,07 8.07 0.87 3.46 0.47 
15 1 7.92 1.21 -5.02 -0.50 24.66 2.90** 
16 1 5.86 0.81 5.48 0.48 5.73 0.63 
I7 1 3.04 0.48 -1.09 —0.11 4 . 6 6  0 . 6 0  
18 1 17.00 1.85* 19.61 1.34 1 2 . 3 8  1.08 
19 1 -3.10 -0.45 7.70 0 . 7 1  -15.10 -1.74 
110 1 -11.60 -1.55 3.78 0.30 -19.71 -2.18* 
ME 1 -14.50 —4.30** -15.88 -2.84** -12.77 -3.01** 
BIJ 1 -26.98 —3.83** -27.94 -2.85** -24.28 -2.2S* 
. 3 6 1 5  .386 .404 
N 1149 539 610 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-Americans real 
earnings (Model 3) 
Vari­ All data East 
able DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) 
INT 1 -57.57 -2.46* -16.25 -0.47 
BOR 1 -0.58 -0.16 -5.89 -0.88 
MAR 1 -15.37 -3.26** -25.27 -3.01** 
HRS 1 0.74 0.71 1.83 1.11 
WKS 1 7.39 5.50** 5.75 2.52* 
01 28.09 3.69** 28.20 2.41* 
02 1 25.62 3.71** 31.71 3.10** 
03 1 5.55 0.67 23.12 1.88* 
04 1 -2.81 -0.36 0.13 0.01 
05 1 4.11 0.68 4.22 0.48 
06 1 3.62 0.54 6.18 0.59 
07 2_ 1.15 C.LS -1.59 -0.15 
08 1 -6.03 -0.58 -4.76 -0.31 
09 1 -6.07 -0.81 -10.93 -0.95 
EX 1 3.00 8.97** 3.02 5.81** 
EXl 1 -0.05 -7.60** -0.04 —4.86** 
12 1 12.69 1.01 6.93 0.44 
13 1 9.83 1.50 6.88 0.68 
14 1 7.75 1.34 8.66 0.97 
15 1 9.73 1.49 -4.05 -0.42 
16 1 6.84 0.94 5.99 0.55 
17 1 3.84 0.61 -1.71 -0.18 
18 1 16.62 1.81 16.26 1.15 
19 1 -2.14 -0.31 9.76 0.93 
110 1 ~H 36 -1.52 3. 65 0,30 
El 1 -20.41 -4.07** -26.26 -3.29** 
E2 1 -14.87 -2.41* -23.55 -2.44* 
E3 1 -10.56 -2.47* -12.58 -1.85* 
E4 1 5.64 1.36 2.05 0.30 
E5 1 43.88 4.74** 64.32 4.43** 
E6 1 63.09 7.31** 55.32 4.04** 
ME 1 -14.60 -4.33** -14.69 -2.72** 
BL 1 -26.32 -3.73** -27.28 -2.88** 
CP 1 69.12 3.46** 30.34 0.95 
West 
Coeff < t-value 
R 
N 
.371 
1149 
.397 
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(3) 
-102.27 
5.53 
-10.41 
1.07 
8.44 
27.80 
21.41 
-11.74 
-3.53 
3.88 
1.08 
2.87 
-8.18 
-2.89 
2.87 
-0.05 
29.27 
11.39 
4.06 
26.32 
6.30 
5.68 
13.68 
-15.69 
-20.90 
-12.03 
-5.06 
-6.77 
7.05 
24.07 
70.89 
-13.67 
-24.98 
107.05 
.404 
610 
- 2 .02 *  
1.09 
-1.89* 
0 . 8 0  
5.16** 
2.73** 
2.24* 
-1.06 
-0.35 
0.46 
0.12 
0.27 
-0.58** 
-0.29** 
6.58 
-5.53 
1.14 
1.33 
0.53 
2.95** 
0 . 6 6  
0.69 
1.14 
-1.73* 
-2.21* 
-1.88* 
-0.64 
-1.25 
1.40 
2.04* 
6.54** 
- 3 . 0 8 * *  
-2.25* 
2.34** 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Recalling Smith and Newman's (1977) estimated differ­
ential in chapter 1, the differential obtained here is 
both smaller in size and insignificant. This again sug­
gests that their estimate is difficult to generalize due to 
their limited selection of border and nonborder regions. 
For the regional divisions, the east differential for 
both models is presented in column 2 of Table 5 (model 2) 
and Table 5 (model 3). Similarly, the west differential is 
in column 3 of these same tables for models 2 and 3, respec­
tively. The east differential is insignificant for both 
models; however, the sizes of these differentials are differ­
ent. When model 2 is used, a $158 differential is found. 
When model 3 is used, a $589 differential is found. Two 
important points should be made about this difference, how­
ever. First, the size of both is sm.all relative to the mean 
earnings of the east. Second, the cost of living (CP) vari­
able of model 3 is insignificant, although of the expected 
positive sign. 
The west border differential is positive for both models 
(though both are statistically insignificant). Note that the 
cost of living variable (CP) is positive as expected and 
statistically significant. 
The racial subdivisions are presented in Tables 7 and 
8. Having obtained similar results from models 2 and 3, only 
model 2 is used in this analysis. One important point to 
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Table 7. Non-Mexican-American Real earnings 
Vari­
able 
All data East West 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
INT 1 0.13 O.Ol -15.55 -0.66 9.54 0.49 
BOR 1 1.35 0.27 6.55 0.52 3.12 0.55 
MAR 1 -18.Ou -2.33* -25.83 -1.97* -12.02 -1.29 
HRS 1 -1.32 -0.84 0.27 0.11 -0.65 -0.33 
WKS 1 8.65 3.80** 6.69 1.72* 8.50 3.10** 
05 1 7.11 1.17 11.83 1.25 1.39 0,18 
OH 1 34.39 5.71** 42.41 4,33'** 30.13 3.93** 
OW 1 2.74 0.37 23.70 1.94* -11.76 -1.34 
EX 1 4.00 7.84** 4.64 5.98** 3.71 5.47** 
EXl 1 -0.07 -7.04** -0.07 -5.09** -0.07 -5.11** 
11 1 -23.61 -1.12 -7.25 -0.23 -35,69 -1,32 
12 1 20.54 1.34 21.44 1.09 28,52 0,94 
13 1 7.25 0.71 14.69 0.92 5,08 0,39 
14 1 12.21 1.44 22.48 1.74* 4.29 0.39 
15 1 13.15 1.37 1.52 0.11 28,96 2.29* 
16 1 17.35 1.65* 22.42 1.40 9.05 0.57 
17 1 8.13 0.85 6.94 0.47 5,52 0.46 
18 1 30.81 2.46* 42.87 2.18* 14,57 0.91 
19 1 3.54 0.33 20.24 1.31 -15.77 -1.14 
110 1 -1.91 -0.18 27.92 1.46 -15.43 -1.28 
El 1 -10.89 -1.15 -29.15 -2.12* 14,14 1.02 
EM 1 -10.72 -1.77* -17.89 -1.89* -1.18 -0.15 
EN 1 12. 82 2.33* 12.83 1.42 12.10 1.83* 
BL 1 -27.04 -3.14** -23.51 -1.98* -33,52 -2.57* 
9 
R- .270 .317 .302 
N 708 342 365 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Mexican-American real earnings 
vari­
able DF 
All date East West 
Coef f. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
(1) (2) (3) 
INT 1 2.90 0.30 10. 02 0.61 -3.16 -0.27 
BCR 1 -4.31 -1.09 -4.18 -0.74 4.39 0.67 
MAR 1 -13.55 -3.05** -30.88 -3.35** -8.19 -1.79* 
HRS 1 3.08 2.79** 4.49 2.35* 2.15 1.65* 
WKS 1 6.60 5.31** 6.04 2.64** 6.97 4.93** 
05 1 2.85 0.75 -2.36 -0.35 7.61 1.79* 
OH 1 24.49 4.96** 32.23 3.71** 18.22 3.09** 
OW 1 0.48 0.09 -2.13 -0.23 7.14 1.07 
EX 1 1.54 4.25** 0.61 0.93 2.02 4.90** 
EXl 1 -0.02 - 3 . 3 3 * *  -0.01 -0.76 -0.03 -3.48** 
13 1 14.37 2.20 6.12 0.51 20.65 2 . 4 0 *  
14 1 10.08 1.73* 14.02 1.48 8 . 9 8  1.15 
15 1 3.68 0.52 -2.67 -0.25 14.34 1.46 
16 1 -0.57 -0.07 -5.98 -0.49 5.50 0.63 
17 1 -0.77 -0.12 0.07 0.01 -3.49 -0.40 
18 1 -0.41 -0.03 0.26 0.01 5.32 0.32 
19 1 -5.38 -0.76 0.03 0.00 -8.38 -0.95 
110 1 1.67 0.20 -9,28 -0.73 15.77 1.42 
11 1 -5.78 -0.76 -9,03 -0.72 -1.99 -0.20 
El 1 -18.16 -3.95** -11,45 -1.31 -19.76 -3.88** 
EM 1 -4.88 -1.14 -2.60 -0.32 -6.68 -1.44 
EN 1 15.86 2.89** 9.60 0.90 19.58 3.36** 
R2  
.339 .337 .450 
N 441 197 244 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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note about these results is that the border earnings dif­
ferentials become positive for all groups except for the 
aggregate and east samples of the Mexican-American popula­
tion. This means that the annual earnings for Mexican-
Americans of the west as well as the earnings of all non-
Mexican- Americans are higher along the border than in the 
nonborder region, after socioeconomic characteristics are 
controlled for. And though these results are statistically 
insignificant, these results are consistent with the aggre­
gate data in Table 5. Namely, the border/nonbcrder wage 
differential disappears when real earnings are used rather 
than nominal earnings.^ 
A more important point for this thesis, however, is 
that the east Mexican-American population continues to show 
a negative earnings differential (though this differential 
is smaller than that estimated by Smith and Newman, 1977, 
$719). It is of interest, thus, to relate this finding to 
the fact that border regions of the east have the highest 
concentration levels of Mexican-Americans in the country. 
It is possible that Mexican-Americans from the east border 
value the proximity of Mexico (closeness to their cultural 
heritage) and/or these concentration levels (closeness to 
their "own people") as nonpecujiiary advantages of locating 
along this border region. This is tested in the following 
^A point should be made, however, that though the aggre­
gate data do not show a border/nonborder differential, it is 
possible that occupational or educational subgroups may. 
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section. However, before doing this, a brief note on the 
control variables is presented. 
A note on the control variables used in the multiple 
regression models Most of the variables in the regres­
sion models presented are dummy variables. To avoid co1lin­
earity , a deleted group occurs for each one of the sets of 
dummy categories which represents each variable. Specifi­
cally, for EDUCATION, 12 years of education was used; for 
OCCUPATION, the two digit occupational code category of 
"LABORERS, EXCEPT FARM" was used for the aggregate data, and 
all laborers for the region and race divisions; for INDUSTRY, 
the two digit industrial code of "PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION" was 
used. Similarly, the other variables which have only one 
category have as their counterpart the deleted group (for 
example, UNMARRIED has married individuals as the deleted 
group). With this in mind, the hypothesis mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter for each one of these variables 
can now be explored. 
The EDUCATION categories all have the expected sign 
except for non-Mexican-Americans of the west region. This 
is so, since this category had few observations (17), sug­
gesting a possible bias due to such a small sample size. Of 
interest here is to note that, although in general these re­
sults suggest that more schooling years lead to higher earn­
ings, this is not strictly the case, as evidenced by some 
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of the results obtained for regional divisions. In addi­
tion, the returns to education proved to be different be­
tween Mexican and non-Mexican-Americans. In particular, 
the payoff to education is greater for Mexican-Americans 
than for non-Mexican-Americans. This is evident by looking 
at the payoff for schooling years beyond high school (EM) 
for Mexican-Americans and contrasting this to the payoff 
for non-Mexican-Americans for the same education. This is 
also evident by making the same comparison between the pay­
offs to education for individuals that have an elementary 
education that have not graduated from high school (EN), and 
by noticing that the Mexican-American group is hurt the most 
by not having an elementary education (El). 
These findings suggest that Mexican-Americans benefit 
more than do non-Mexican-Americans from additional schooling 
years, but are more adversely affected if (possibly due to 
a stronger discrimination effect) they have little education. 
This can be rationalized by observing that educated Mexican-
Americans are fewer in numbers and thus are able to command 
higher wages with firms that seek to employ Mexican-Americans 
(due to possible pressures from Affirmative Action programs). 
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The UNMARRIED coefficient was also statistically sig­
nificant in all of the regressions and of the right sign. 
More interesting, however, is to note the Mexican-American 
and the Black coefficients in these tests. They are both 
statistically significant and of the right signs throughout. 
Furthermore, the BLACK coefficient is larger in absolute 
value than the Mexican-American coefficient, suggesting 
that pay discrimination is larger for Blacks than it is for 
Mexican-Americans. 
The occupational categories were mostly of the right 
sign, too. Professional occupations as well as crafts and 
managerial occupations are all positive, suggesting that 
these occupations have hi^er earnings (due to their higher 
skill levels), other things constant, than the laborer occupa­
tions. Not so clear, however, are the signs of the white 
collar occupations that traditionally require lower skill 
levels. For these occupations (such as clerical and sales), 
the coefficients changed signs, as evidenced by some of the 
region and race divisions regressions. This is not incon­
sistent, however, since not all of these occupations are 
high paying occupations. On the other hand, the results 
also indicate that other low-skill occupations earn less 
than laborers such as service workers and farm laborers 
when the aggregate data are used. The statistical signifi­
cance of these coefficients is mixed since some of these 
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categories had few observations, creating the same problem 
as that mentioned for the EDUCATION categories above. 
Overall, with respect to the INDUSTRY dummy variable, 
the results imply that individuals working in the Public Ad­
ministration industry (the deleted industry) have lower annu­
al earnings relative to most other industries, the exceptions 
being the service industries as well as the "TRANSPORTATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS, AND OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES" industries. 
As with the OCCUPATION categories, the statistical signifi­
cance of some of these coefficients was probably affected 
by the small number of observations in some of these 
categories. 
The continuous variables, EXPERIENCE, HOURS WORKED, 
and WEEKS WORKED, can also be ejjplored. EXPERIENCE has the 
right signs in both the linear and quadratic terms as ex­
pected. In addition, it is highly significant in most 
cases. Of interest is to note that the payoff to additional 
years of experience is greater for non-Mexican-Americans 
(up to approximately 28 years of experience) than for 
Mexican-Americans. After 28 years, however, the Mexican-
American payoff is still positive for additional years up to 
approximately 40 years of experience, while that for non-
Mexican- Americans is negative for this same range of years. 
Although not the focus of this thesis, this finding may be 
of interest to human capital researchers and worthy of 
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future research. 
HOURS WORKED has the wrong sign only for the non-
Mexican- American west region division (however, it is 
statistically insignificant). But this could be attributed 
to how these data are presented in the sample, as mentioned 
before. Finally, WEEKS WORKED is both of the right sign and 
statistically significant in all of the tests mentioned here. 
Are Compensating Wage Differentials Important 
in the Wage Structure of Mexican-Americans? 
Of primary interest here is to test if Mexican-Americans 
value proximity to other Mexican-Americans as a compensating 
wage differential. Two measures are used to test this 
possibility; the distance they are located from the U.S./ 
Mexico border and the concentration of Mexican-Americans in 
the SMSAs in which they work. The model used to test this 
hypothesis has the form of model 4; 
J = f(Y;MA;distance) 
where J = I (as defined before) when nominal earnings are 
being compared and J = l/P (also as defined before) when real 
earnings are compared. Y = X (X as defined before) deleting 
the BORDER variable and adding a variable "SIZE". There are 
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two reasons for deleting the BORDER variable.^ First, in­
cluding both MA and BORDER in the same regression affected 
other control variables (i.e., EDUCATION and EXPERIENCE) such 
that a possible collinearity between these two variables was 
apparent. For example, some evidence of this possible 
collinearity can be shown by comparing the Brownsville, 
Texas SMSA (along the border) which has a concentration of 
Mexican-Americans (MA) of approximately 62% with the Dallas, 
Texas SMSA (further inland) that has a 4% concentration of 
Mexican-Americans. Second, it was judged that the objectives 
of this section were to see the effect of the concentration 
of Mexican-Americans in an SMSA and the distance of an SMSA 
from the border (DISTANCE) on earnings, rather than to see 
if a border/nonborder differential existed. 
A variable that was added, however, is SIZE. This 
measures the population of each SMSA as presented in the 1970 
Census Reports. The reason for including it is that the 
SMSAs of the sample in this thesis fluctuate considerably 
in size. Thus, it was deemed appropriate to control for any 
^The general results of including both the MA and the 
BORDER variables were that the BORDER coefficient became 
positive (but still small in absolute value) in some in­
stances (mostly for non-Mexican-Americans) and smaller in 
absolute value (for Mexican-Americans) in others. These 
coefficients were also statistically insignificant. In 
addition, DISTANCE is viewed as substituting for the 
BORDER variable. 
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earnings differential inherently due to this factor, allow­
ing me to better isolate the effects of the MA and DISTANCE 
variables. A more complete discussion of DISTANCE and MA 
follows. 
DISTANCE is measured as the number of miles from the 
major city of an SMSA to the closest border city. The rea­
son for using the major city is that in some cases the PUS 
geographic definition of an SMSA is too broad, making the 
individual's exact location within a particular SMSA uncer­
tain. The test here is to see if longer distances will be 
positively correlated with earnings for Mexican-Americans 
but not for non-Mexican-Americans. This comparison is made 
because a similar non-Mexican-American correlation would 
indicate that this effect for Mexican-Americans may not be 
related to their need to locate closer to the border but 
for other reasons. 
MA is the ratio of male Mexican-Americans in the labor 
force to all males in the labor force of an SMSA. It is 
expected that higher concentrations of Mexican-Americans 
will be negatively correlated with earnings for Mexican-
Americans, but not for non-Mexican-Americans, at least with 
respect to the cultural heritage argument made above. It 
should be noted here that the MA variable is subject to a 
number of other interpretations. A full discussion of this 
problem is presented in the empirical discussion of this 
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variable. 
An additional point should be made before the empirical 
results are presented. Both the DISTANCE and the MA vari­
ables are entered with both a linear and quadratic term. 
This was done to allow for a nonlinear impact of these 
variables on earnings. 
The DISTANCE variable 
Table 9 shows the results of this variable on Mexican-
Americans and non-Mexican-Americans (see Appendix B for full 
regressions). The elasticities suggest that there is no 
distance effect for either of these two groups. This is 
evident by looking at the small absolute value of these 
elasticities as well as by noticing that these values are 
statistically insignificant. Furthermore, it should be 
pointed out that the elasticities for Mexican-Americans are 
of the wrong sign. 
The conclusion obtained from these results is that the 
hypothesis of Mexican-Americans willingness to accept lower 
pay to locate closer to the border is not substantiated. 
Nevertheless, two problems exist with refuting this hypothe­
sis altogether. First, the data do not permit us to trace 
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Table 9. Distance elasticities^ 
Nominal Real 
Mexican-American -.060 -.149 
( .948) (.00001) 
Non-Mexican-American .018 .024 
(.319) (.314) 
^F-statistics are shown in parentheses. None are sig-
nigicant. 
the Mexican-American's actual regional "tie" to Mexico. For 
example, a Mexican-American working in San Antonio, Texas 
may be closer to his nearest Mexican relative than one who 
works along the border. Second, some Mexican-Americans 
of this sample may not be first-generation Mexican-
Americans and thus do not see Mexico as a "homeland" but as 
their parents' or grandparents' "homeland". Ideally, data 
for first-generation Mexican-Americans along with informa­
tion on the location of their origin in Mexico (to better 
judge the proximity of their "cultural heritage") would pro­
vide a better test for this hypothesis. 
The MA variable 
As mentioned above, this variable may not be measuring 
a compensating wage differential effect alone. First, higher 
concentrations of Mexican-Americans in a region may lead to 
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higher levels of discrimination as well as higher Mexican 
alien inflows. The discrimination effect may be rationalized 
(see G. Becker, 1971, Economics of Discrimination) on the 
ground that non-Mexican-Americans are more prone to dis­
criminate against Mexican-Americans the more identifiable 
and noticeable they are in a region. The illegal alien ef­
fect may be due to the fact that illegal aliens may have an 
incentive to work in regions where they can "blend in" and 
be more invisible to avoid detection. The regions with a 
high concentration of Mexican-Americans permit them to do 
this. 
The major finding can be found by looking at the elas­
ticities for both Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-
Americans in the "All occupations" category in Table 10. 
These elasticities for Mexican-Americans are both negative 
as expected and are significant for both nominal and real 
earnings. More surprising is that the elasticities of MA 
are negative for non-Mexican-Americans, although only sig­
nificant at the 10% level for real earnings for this group. 
This is an important finding since it is consistent 
with the compensating, illegal alien, and discrimination 
effects discussed above for Mexican-Americans. It is also 
important to note that the elasticities are larger in abso­
lute value for Mexican-Americans than those for non-
Mexican-Americans. It may be that this differential is 
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Table 10. MA elasticities a 
Nominal Real 
Mexican-American 
Ail occupations -.195** -.149* 
(7.804) (3.555) 
Professional and managers -.120 -.112 
(.740) (.299) 
Sales and clerical -„054 +.035 
(.022) (.257) 
Crafts -.238 -.203 
(3.041) (1.885) 
Laborers and service -.231* -.197 
(4.289) (2.086) 
No n-Mexican-Ame r ic an s 
Ail occupations -.094 -.102 
(2.239) (2.729) 
Professional and managers -.087 -.109 
(.671) (1.531) 
Sales and clerical -.354 -.388* 
(3.010) (4.238) 
Crafts ,067 .049 
(1.217) (.536) 
Laborers and service -.146* -.132* 
(3.760) (3.114) 
^F-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
*,**Significant at the 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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due to the compensating effect hypothesized here, or to a 
differential impact of illegal aliens on both groups (con­
sistent with the hypothesis that Mexican-Americans are af­
fected the most by illegal aliens), or to the discrimination 
effect also m.entioned above, or to a combination of these 
effects. 
Nevertheless, two additional points must be made. These 
points are of considerable importance in interpreting these 
results. First, these results could also be due to the fact 
that high concentrations of Mexican-Americans are associated 
with SMSAs with low cost of living levels. And although this 
problem is recognized by comparing real earnings, it should 
be noted that the cost of living measure used in this analy­
sis is not entirely satisfactory. These measures, as men­
tioned in the footnote on page 38, were sometimes estimated, 
raising questions of their effectiveness at controlling pre­
cisely for the cost of living differences among regions. 
How major is this problem? There is no way of knowing 
with the available data. But closer inspection of two pre­
vious results may give some indication. First, recalling 
models 2 and 3, it was shown that for the aggregate data, 
the cost of living index was significant and of the right 
sign. However, when the data were divided into east and 
west, the cost of living control for the east was of the 
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right sign but statistically insignificant. Second, re­
ferring back to Table IC, for the Mexican-American elas­
ticities there is a drop in the absolute value of the elas­
ticities, as expected, from nominal to real earnings. How­
ever, this is not the case for non-Mexican-Americans. Con­
sequently, the safest thing that can be said about this 
problem is that though it is probably not controlling for 
cost of living differences between SMSAs as efficiently as it 
should, it does control for some of this problem. And, al­
though these results should be analyzed with caution, the 
evidence does not suggest that the MA effect is solely due 
to a cost of living differential between SMSAs. 
Another important point in interpreting these results 
is that the concentration of Mexican-Americans in an SMSA 
may have a differential impact among occupations. To attempt 
to isolate these impacts, the data were divided into occupa­
tional groups. Recalling the study by Briggs (1975) in the 
review of literature chapter on the characteristics of 
illegal aliens, it is expected that the lower skilled groups 
would be the most likely to be affected by illegal aliens. 
Another argument that could be made, although perhaps not as 
compelling, is that these same (low skilled) occupational 
groups may be the ones most affected by discrimination. 
Therefore, the test is to see if all Mexican-American 
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occupational groups are equally affected by this variable. 
If this is true, then this would suggest that a compensating 
effect may exist due to higher concentrations of Mexican-
Americans. Likewise, these same occupational divisions were 
made for non-Mexican-Americans to provide a stronger test 
for the idea above : if a compensating effect exists (of 
the nature described in this thesis), it should be unique to 
Mexican-Americans. Referring back to Table 10 these occupa­
tional subdivisions are listed. 
The LABORERS AND SERVICE occupational subdivision is 
negative and statistically significant three out of four 
times (with the F-statistic for the real earnings of Mexican-
Americans coming close to being statistically significant at 
the 10% level). This is (as with the "ALL OCCUPATIONS" sub­
division) consistent with the hypothesis mentioned above for 
the compensating, discrimination, and illegal alien effects 
for Mexican-Americans. For non-Mexican-Americans, this re­
sult is consistent with the illegal alien hypothesis in 
that this differential could be due to an excess supply 
caused by illegal entry. Furthermore, the absolute value 
of this differential is larger for Mexican-Americans than 
for non-Mexican-Americans. This again is consistent with 
Mexican-Americans having the three hypothesized effects 
mentioned above. 
The CRAFTS subdivision is very different for both racial 
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groups. While it is small, positive, and insignificant for 
non-Mexican-Americans in both real and nominal earnings, it 
is larger in absolute value, negative, and significant for 
nominal earnings for the Mexican-American group. Real earn­
ings are also larger in absolute value for Mexican-Americans. 
What does this mean? It means that, again, for Mexican-
Americans any one of or a combination of the three hypothe­
sized effects may be present to create this differential. 
The fact that the non-Mexican-American group is not affected 
suggests that this effect is unique to Mexican-Americans. 
It further suggests that for non-Mexican-Americans this 
occupational group is not affected by the illegal alien 
effect. 
The SALES AND CLERICAL results are the most surprising. 
For non-Mexican-Americans, they are negative and significant 
for both real and nominal earnings. In addition, they are 
the largest effects relative to the other elasticities for 
non-Mexican-Americans. On the other hand, this same subdivi­
sion for Mexican-Americans is statistically insignificant and 
is the smallest of the elasticities relative to the other 
elasticities for Mexican-Americans. A possible explanation 
for this result can be given, however. These occupations 
are service occupations. In other words, they require con­
tact with individuals of the community. Taking this into 
account, then, what this result suggests is that non-Mexican-
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Americans in regions with high concentrations of Mexican-
Americans are not as productive (possibly due to a language 
problem) than in areas with low concentrations of Mexican-
Americans. Furthermore, the SMSAs in the sample which have 
the highest concentration of Mexican-Americans are along the 
border, and these border areas have a commercial base which 
caters to Mcxican nationals. Again, non-Mexican-Americans 
in sales and clerical occupations may find it more difficult 
to service these customers, due to language problems, 
than Mexican-Americans who are more likely to communicate 
in Spanish. 
However, this raises a question as to the small and in­
significant effect of this elasticity for Mexican-Americans. 
For this result suggests that Mexican-Americans in this sub­
division earn the same regardless of the concentration of 
Mexican-Americans. It would be expected that their bicul-
tural advantage would lead to higher earnings in areas along 
the border and in areas with high concentrations of Mexican-
Americans in general. An explanation for this net being so 
may be in the offsetting effects of the illegal alien, the 
discrimination and the compensating effects mentioned above. 
The PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERS subdivision is insignifi­
cant for both Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-Americans. 
Their magnitudes are similar also. This suggests that this 
effect is the same for both groups and thus is not strong 
evidence to suggest that Mexican-Americans, in this category. 
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are more affected than non-Mexican-Americans with high con­
centrations of Mexican-Americans. Conclusions about the 
three hypothesized effects for Mexican-Americans are thus not 
evident for this group. A point could be made that both the 
Mexican-American and the non-Mexican-American groups are 
equally affected by illegal alien entry, but this does not 
seem reasonable since, as mentioned before, it is expected 
that this impact is more prevalent for the lower occupa­
tional groups. Another possible explanation is that this 
differential impact is due to different underlying reasons 
for both racial groups. Specifically, the Mexican-American 
group effect may be due to a compensating effect and/or a 
discrimination effect, while the non-Mexican-American effect 
may be due to an explanation similar to that for the SALES 
"AND CLERICAL group mentioned above. Arguments to substantiate 
this hypothesis, however, cannot be tested with the available 
data. 
The breakdown of occupational categories for both 
Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-Americans leads to an im­
portant finding. This is that the MA variable has a differ­
ent effect on the occupational categories of both groups. 
Specifically, for the Mexican-American group, the LABORERS 
AND SERVICES and CRAFTS categories are the major categories 
affected by the t^A variable, versus the LABORERS AND SERVICES 
and the SALES AND CLERICAL occupations for non-Mexican-
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Americans. For both groups, the MA variable had an insig­
nificant impact on the PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERS occupational 
category. 
Consequently, this latter conclusion raises questions 
regarding the validity of the importance of compensating 
wage differentials in the earnings equations of Mexican-
Americans. These questions arise when the following two 
points are considered. First, it is evident that the blue-
collar occupations are the ones most affected by the MA vari­
able for the Mexican-American group, both in significance 
and relative absolute size, relative to the white-collar 
occupations. This is more consistent with the illegal alien 
hypothesis than it is with the compensating effect hypothe­
sis. Second, an argument in favor of compensating differ­
entials is that the PROFESSIONAL AND MANAGERS and SALES AND 
CLERICAL occupâtionsl categories (except for SALES AND 
CLERICAL real earnings) are also negative for Mexican-
Americans and that these categories are not affected by 
illegal entry.^ But this argument is valid only if Mexican-
Americans are considered alone. This argument becomes less 
^Though it is not totally clear that the SALES AND 
CLERICAL occupations are not affected by illegal entry, 
since some of these jobs are of the low skill nature, this 
possibility becomes more evident if we remember that these 
occupations require some fluency in English which is not 
likely to be prevalent among illegal aliens. 
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persuasive when the non-Mexican-American group is included 
in the analysis. As mentioned above, the white-collar occu­
pations have the same or a larger absolute effect for non-
Mexican -Americans than for Mexican-Americans. Furthermore, 
the LABORERS AND SERVICES occupations are also negative and 
significant suggesting an illegal alien entry effect for 
both groups (and ruling out the possibility of a sole dis­
crimination effect for Mexican-Americans in this category). 
In concluding this section, the evidence presented here 
does not provide us with enough support to state that Mexi­
can-Americans value a high concentration of Mexican-Americans 
as a compensating wage differential. At best what can be 
said is that the MA variable may pick up a compensating 
effect along with other effects. Ideally, if the discrimina­
tion and the illegal alien effects could be controlled for, 
then a stronger test would be possible to test compensating 
effects due to this variable. 
A brief note on other compensating variables 
To see the impact of other compensating variables on 
earnings for both Mexican-Americans and non-Mexican-Americans, 
two variables were chosen: CLIMATE and CRIME RATE. After 
doing several tests ; CLIMATE did not show evidence of being 
an important determinant of earnings for either of the two 
racial groups. CRIME RATE, on the other hand, did prove 
to be important for Mexican-Americans, but its sign was 
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different than expected. Specifically, higher crime rates 
led to lower earnings. This was judged to be a problem of 
reverse causation, i.e., areas with low earnings are also 
areas with high crime rates. This problem was not judged to 
be of direct importance to this thesis and was not explored 
further. However, future research dealing with a related 
point may want to explore this point fully. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this thesis suggest no evidence of a 
real or nominal border/nonborder earnings differential when 
socioeconomic characteristics are controlled for. However, 
when subdivisions are made on the aggregate data, a nominal 
earnings differential is found for Mexican-Americans, in 
particular for Mexican-Americans from the east. This dif­
ferential, however, disappears when real earnings are studied. 
These findings suggest that Smith and Newman's (1977) study 
may have been misleading due to the limited number of border 
and nonborder SMSAs they used. 
There is no clear evidence that compensating wage dif­
ferentials are important in the wage structure of Mexican-
Americans. Distance from the border shows no effect as a 
compensating differential. The concentration of Mexican-
Americans in an SMSA is negative as expected, but there are 
conflicting interpretations of this result. Specifically, 
this variable may pick up other noncompensating effects such 
as discrimination and illegal alien effects. Discrimination 
effects are suggested when the data are broken down by 
occupation and the impact of the variable on Mexican-
Americans and non-Mexican-Americans is compared. Mexican-
Americans (in the majority of the cases) are more affected 
than non-Mexican-Americans, which is consistent with the 
discrimination effect hypothesis. Illegal alien effects are 
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also suggested, when these breakdowns are made, by noting 
that the low skill occupations are most affected by the MA 
variable. This is consistent with the illegal alien 
hypothesis. 
This study does have several limitations. First, the 
cost of living index measure proved to be crucial in the con­
clusions mentioned above for both the border/nonborder dif­
ferential and the compensating differentials. A better 
measure should provide better estimates of the effect of 
using real rather than nominal earnings. It would also have 
permitted a better estimate of the MA effect (areas which 
have high concentrations of Mexican-Americans may also have 
a low cost of living) as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Second, there is a limited amount of information on the 
characteristics of Mexican-Americans, This problem was more 
evident when measuring compensating effects. In particular, 
better information on the origin of Mexican-Americans (are 
they first, second, or third generation Mexican-Americans?) 
as well as their specific location within a region (the 
disadvantage of the PUS sample in this regard was mentioned 
in the previous chapter) could be useful in analyzing the 
effect of the distance variable. The specific location of 
an individual within a region would also help in interpret­
ing the MA variable since SMSAs may have subcities which have 
different concentrations of Mexican-Americans. 
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Likewise, more data on the illegal alien population may 
help isolate the illegal alien effect on earnings captured 
by the MA variable. Collecting these data, however, is a 
difficult task, due to the nature of the illegal alien prob­
lem. The discrimination effect might also be isolated by 
collecting data on firm attitudes toward workers of different 
races. The importance of isolating these two effects is 
that it would be possible to make a clearer interpretation 
of the MA effect on earnings due to a compensating effect. 
Third, an improvement on this research would be to in­
crease the sample size to increase the number of subdivisions 
of the data. This would permit further investigation on the 
occupational impacts suggested in this thesis by the MA 
variable. 
Finally, it would also be of interest to see how these 
results apply to other grotç)S. Specifically, are these 
results applicable to females and males nonheads of house­
holds? 
The policy implications can be discussed by noting an 
important point of these findings. The MA variable is more 
important in explaining depressed earnings than is the bcrder/ 
nonborder dummy variable. In previous research, emphasis has 
been placed on the proximity of a city to the Mexican border 
to judge if this city has depressed wages. I suggest in this 
research that the more important characteristic is the con-
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centrâtion of Mexican-Americans in a city and show evidence 
to support this conclusion. A point should be made, however, 
that these two variables are highly correlated. In other 
words, the areas which have the highest concentration of Mexi­
can- Americans tend to be the areas located along the border. 
But there are other areas which have high concentrations of 
Mexican-Americans which are not along the border. In this 
sense, there is a distinction between the two. 
The policy implications are very different depending on 
the emphasis that is being placed (concentration of Mexican-
Americans or the border/nonborder differential). If a border/ 
nonborder differential criterion is to be used, then the 
policy implications of this thesis -would suggest that any 
program designed to increase earnings along the border may 
be counterproductive since it would be raising wages which 
otherwise appear to be in approximate balance. On the other 
hand, if SMSAs with high concentrations of Mexican-Americans 
are used, then future research should be geared to determin­
ing the sources of the negative MA effect on earnings. If 
this is primarily a compensating effect, then, again, any 
programs to help the depressed area would disturb an equi­
librium balance. If this effect is due, on the other hand; 
to an illegal alien or discrimination effect, then the policy 
actions might be to restrict entry in the former case or to 
increase programs such as Affirmative Action programs to re­
duce discrimination in the latter case. 
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APPENDIX A 
List of SMSAs (E - SMSAs in East sample; W - SMSAs in 
West sample; C - two SMSAs combined in the PUS sample; 
B - border SMSAs): 
1. Alameda, California (W) 
2. Albuquerque, New Mexico (E) 
3. Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, California (W) 
4. Austin, Texas (E) 
5. Bakersfield, California (W) 
6. Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange, Texas (E) 
7. Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito/McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg 
Texas (E) (C) (B) 
8. Corpus Christi, Texas (E) 
9. Dallas, Texas (E) 
10. Denver, Colorado (E) 
11. El Paso, Texas/Las Graces, New Mexico (E) (C) (B) 
12. Fresno, California (W) 
13. Galveston-Texas City, Texas (E) 
14. Houston, Texas (E) 
15. Laredo, Texas (E) (B) 
16. Los Angeles, California (W) 
17. Lubbock, Texas (E) 
18. Modesto, California (W) 
19. Odessa, Texas (E) 
20. Phoenix, Arizona (E) 
21. Pueblo, Colorado (E) 
22. Sacramento, California (W) 
23. San Angelo, California (W) 
24. San Antonio, Texas (E) 
25. San Bernadino-Riverside-Ontario, California (W) 
25. San Diego, California (W) (B) 
27. San Francisco-Oakland, California (W) 
2 8 .  San Jose, California (W) 
2 9 .  Santa Barbara, California (W) 
30. Santa Rosa, California (W) 
31. Stockton, California (W) 
32. Tucson, Arizona (E) 
33. Vallejo-Napa, California (W) 
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Table Bl. Mexican-American earnings, all data 
Nominal Real 
Variable df Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 14.20 1.25 9.58 0.84 
MAR 1 -13.96 -3.18** -13.65 -3-08** 
HRS 1 2.90 2.57** 3.38 3.09** 
WKS 1 5.69 5.47** 5.71 5.44** 
EX. 1 1.74 4.84** 1.58 4.53** 
EXl 1 -0.02 -3.59** -0.02 -3.45** 
01 1 35.93 4.48** 12. 51 2,01* 
02 1 20.26 -0.41 4. 83 0.82 
03 1 -4.29 -0.42 -4.63 -0,57 
04 1 9.62 1.37 -7.12 -0,92 
05 1 7.04 1.35 -1.72 -0.27 
05 1 4.54 0.79 3.63 0.30 
07 1 17.98 2.55** -8.90 -1.19 
08 1 -5.13 -0.53 3.11 0.38 
09 1 -5.48 -0.85 37.01 4,58** 
13 1 12.85 2.08 20.01 2,82** 
14 1 4.80 0.83 -5.54 -0.54 
15 1 -4.27 -0.52 9.33 1,33 
15 1 -7.83 -1.04 5.55 1.27 
17 1 -2.48 -0.39 4.42 0.77 
18 1 0.51 0.04 18.35 2.58** 
19 1 -7.24 -1.07 -5.50 -0.67 
110 1 5.20 0.54 -5.50 -0.85 
El 1 -17.93 -3.92** -17.61 -3.82** 
EM 1 -3.80 -0.90 -4.03 -0.96 
EN 1 17.85 3.31** 15.03 - 2.77** 
SIZE 2 5.4x10"' 1. 07 2.4x10" 0. 39 
DIST 1 -0.04 r -1.38 -0.03 _ -0.98 
S 1 5,0x10" 1-30 4.0x10' 0.87 
MAP 1 -97.93 -2.50** -81.51 -2.15* 
T 1 75.55 1.44 79.50 1.49 
.4128 .3840 
N 441 441 
*,**Significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 
in this and subsequent tables in this appendix. "S" is equal 
to (DIST)^ and "T" is equal to (MAP)^. 
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Table B2. Non-Mexican-American earnings, all data 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 17.78 0.94 18.22 0.96 
MAR 1 -16.50 -2.11* -16.92 -2.18* 
HRS 1 -1.53 -0.96 -1.34 -0. 84 
WKS 1 8.64 3.76** 8.83 3.85** 
EX 1 3.95 7.68** 4.03 7.86** 
EX.1 1 -0.07 -6.80** -0.07 -6.95** 
BL 1 -29.97 -3.38** -29.86 -3.38** 
01 1 38.95 3.07** -12.09 -0.22** 
02 1 31.50 2.63** 9.46 0.58 
03 1 6.41 0.48 1.12 0.10 
04 1 -7.47 -0.56 5.36 0.58 
05 1 6.14 0.54 8.09 0.80 
06 1 2.12 0.17 10.16 0.91 
07 1 -4.91 - 0 . 3 9  3.93 0.39 
08 1 -27.71 -0.46 24.89 1. 89* 
0 9  1 -8.88 -0.64 -0.85 -0.08 
II 1 -2.71 -0.05 -4.88 -0.44 
12 1 6.40 0.39 34.73 2.75** 
13 1 3.33 0.31 28.93 2.43* 
14 1 8.19 0.88 6.69 0.50 
15 1 10.32 1.01 -9.43 -0.71 
16 1 11.09 0.98 4.47 0.40 
17 1 4.83 0.48 2 . 0 2  0.16 
18 1 25.44 1.93* -5.66 -0.45 
19 1 0.64 0.06 -24.02 -0.40 
110 1 -4.60 -0.41 -12.25 - 0 . 8 9  
El 1 - 1 4 . 8 5  -1.55 -13.11 - 1 . 2 8  
EM 1 -15.29 -2.49* -13.13 -2.15* 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
9.66 
-5.3x10" 6 O  
1.71* 
-0.50 
10.71 
-1.1x10" 6 
1.90* 
-1.12 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
4.0x10 
9.6x10" 
O  
6 0.12 0.18 
0.02 
-3.2x10" 5 
0.76 
-0.61 
MAP 1 -115.59 -1.91* -139.49 -2.32* 
T 1 150.25 1. 52 225.13 2. 28* 
.2845 
708 
.2819 
708 
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Table B3. Non-Mexican-American earnings, professional and 
managers 
Nominal Real 
Vari able DF Coerf. t-value Coeff; t-value 
INT 1 56.52 1.36 58.62 1.43 
MAR 1 -22.59 -1.36 -21.60 -1.32 
HRS 1 -6. 50 -1.66* -5.89 -1.52 
WKS 1 5.44 0.89 5.12 0.85 
EX 1 6.17 4.92** 6,25 5.05** 
EXl 1 -0.09 -3.48** -0.10 -3.61** 
BL 1 -76.24 -2.77** -73.02 -2.69** 
12 1 11.40 0.36 7.56 0.24 
13 1 -12.30 -0.42 -11.67 -0.40 
14 1 5. 31 0.28 -1.39 -0.07 
15 1 11.20 0.54 5.43 0.26 
16 1 11.34 0.72 16.71 0.66 
17 1 17.43 0.77 14.32 0.64 
18 1 31.53 1.11 30.05 1.08 
19 1 4. 39 0.18 -2.80 -0.11 
110 1 -13.02 -0.62 -17.14 -0.83 
El 1 -2.70 -0.06 5.30 0.11 
EM 1 -47.16 -2.67** -41.39 -2.39* 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
20.37 -J 
2.5x10" 
1.76* 
1.15 
22.58 
1.7x10" 7 
1.98* 
0.80 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
-0.03 _ 
2.2x10 
-0.97 
1.50 
-0.04 
1.2x10" •5 
-0.48 
0. 85 
MAP 1 -153.63 -1.12 -202.54 -1.50 
T 1 243.53 1.16 354.17 1.70* 
. 2707 
2 2 9  
.2707 
2 2 9  
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Table B4. Non-Mexican-American earnings, sales and clerical 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 -6.72 -0.15 -2.29 -0.05 
MAR 1 -30.73 -1.35 -35.61 -1.49 
KRS 1 -0.59 -0.13 -0.56 -0.12 
WKS 1 12,30 1.77* 11.70 1.61* 
EX 1 5.10 2.97** 5.29 2.94** 
EXl 1 -0.04 -2.46* -0.09 -2.42* 
BL 1 -22.46 -0.63 -20.94 -0.56 
12 1 -11.58 -0.17 -9.78 -0.14 
13 1 -2.57 -0.07 -3. 21 -0.08 
14 1 20.12 0.81 19.23 0.74 
15 1 8.78 0.29 6.67 0.21 
16 1 25.19 0.97 23. 53 0.87 
17 1 1.13 0.05 -0.24 -0.01 
18 1 31.78 1.28 30.45 1.17 
19 1 25.73 0.35 26.17 0.34 
110 1 73.57 1.87 77.04 1.87* 
El 1 -50.22 -1.03 -48.65 -0.96 
EM 1 -25.34 -1.23 -24.27 -1.12 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
19.01 
-4.3x10" 7 
1.20 
-1.34 
21.34 
-5.1x10 
1.28 
-1.50 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
0.24 
-4.1x10" •5 
2.59* 
-2.48* 
0.27 _4 
4.6x10 
2.75** 
-2.67* 
MAP 1 -485.04 -2.44* -562.47 -2.70** 
T 1 807.96 2.41* 1016.49 2.90** 
R^ .2958 .3143 
N 116 116 
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Table B5. Non-Mexican-American earnings, crafts 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-va lu( 
INT 1 -7.87 -0.28 -15.46 -0.56 
MAR 1 -13.57 -0.99 -11.79 -0.90 
HRS 1 -0.56 -0.22 -0.66 -0.27 
WKS 1 11.23 3.08** 12.44 3.52* 
EX 1 1.83 2.04* 2.02 2.32* 
EXl 1 -0.03 -1.73* -0.04 -1.98* 
BL 1 -23.78 -1.16 -27.26 -1.37 
12 1 42.72 1.53 43.44 1.60* 
13 1 20.11 1.21 20.26 1.26 
14 1 19.74 1.20 20.83 1.31 
15 1 13.81 0. 80 16.60 0.98 
16 1 2.73 0.14 5.73 0.30 
17 1 33.77 1. 82* 36.29 2.02 
18 1 -13.79 -0.30 -0. 80 -0.22 
19 1 10.36 0.56 13.50 0.75 
110 1 7.84 0. 31 10.49 0.42 
El 1 -7.07 -0.54 -4.62 -0.37 
EM 1 3.14 0. 37 5.60 0.68 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
5.84 
1.8x10" -6 
0.67 
1.12 
5.47 7 
8.1x10 
0.65 
0.53 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
0.01 
8.5x10 -6 
0.20 
0.10 
0.04 r 
-4.9x10 
0.74 
-0.61 
MAP 1 103.09 1.10 72.29 0. 80 
T 1 -221.17 -1.41 -148.05 -0.97 
.2369 
160 
.2467 
160 
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Table B6-. Non-Mexican-American earnings, laborers and 
service, all data 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 37.44 1.70* 35.32 1.66* 
MAR 1 -15.51 -1.24 -17.94 -1.49 
HRS 1 1.59 0.66 1.52 0.65 
WKS 1 7.50 2.41* 7.73 2.56* 
EX 1 2.29 3.11** 2.27 3.17** 
EXl 1 -0.05 -3.92** -0.05 -4.03** 
11 1 -13.78 -0.70 -15.48 -0.82 
12 1 17.12 0. 83 27.95 1.40 
13 1 8.09 0.55 8 . 7 4  0.62 
14 1 10.77 0.91 10.71 0.94 
15 1 27.27 2.01* 26.92 2.05* 
16 1 4.66 0.28 4.07 0.25 
17 1 5.88 0.43 5.62 0.43 
19 1 15.61 1.12 15.54 1.15 
110 1 -3.99 - 0 . 2 4  -3.85 -0.24 
BL 1 -20.23 -2.19* -18.98 -2.12* 
El 1 -0.21 -0.02 1. 54 0.15 
EM 1 0.35 0.04 2.01 0.26 
EN 1 -3.47 
-6 -0.35 -1.90 7 -0.20 SIZE 1 -1.2x10' -0.69 -1.8x10" -1.05 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
-0.12 
1.7x10" -4 
-2.47* 
2.34* 
-0.11 
1.5x10" •5 
-2.31* 
2.15* 
MAP 1 -102.51 -1.13 -94.24 -1.07 
T 1 25.39 0.17 29.68 0.20 
.2731 
203 
.2868 
203 
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Table B7. Mexican-American earnings, professional and 
managers 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 32, 80 0. 40 43. 07 0. 57 
MAR 1 -26. 13 -1. 21 -23. 38 -1. 10 
HRS 1 3. 34 0. 43 2. 24 0. 2 9  
WKS 1 10. 05 0. 88 8. 12 0. 72 
EX 1 1. 53 0. 71 1. 69 0. 80 
EXl 1 -0. 02 -0. 47 -0. 02 -0. 54 
13 1 48. 19 1. 39 40. , 6 2  1. 19 
14 1 4. 25 0. 19 7. ,59 0. 34 
15 1 -13. 17 -0. 34 -12. . 4 7  -0. , 3 2  
16 1 1. , 9 9  0. 04 -0. ,01 -0. ,0002 
17 1 19. , 2 7  0. 61 2 5 .  50 0. ,82 
18 1 -5. , 6 9  -0. 15 -1. 91 -0, ,05 
19 1 12. ,47 0. 42 12, .68 0. , 4 3  
El 1 -21. ,38 -0. 57 -26, .48 -0. ,72 
EM 1 -28. 66 -1. 09 -30, .31 -1, .16 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
3 9 .  
8, ; 1X10-8 
2. 
0. 
02 
03 
36, 
-8, 
.34 7 
.0x10" 
1, 
-0, 
.86* 
. 2 4  
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
-0, 
1, 
-0. 
0. 
79 
40 
-0, 
6 
.11 C 
.2x10"^ 
-0, 
0. 
.59 
21 
MAP 1 -58, .97 -0. ,25 -78 . 8 2  -0, .35 
T 1 -24, .14 -0. ,07 50 .58 0, .15 
.3407 
51 
.3243 
61 
94 
Table B8. Mexican-American earnings, sales and clerical 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 -17.94 -0.82 -23.62 -1.05 
MAR 1 -13.48 -1.36 -15.97 -1.50 
HRS i. 1.65 0. 66 2.97 1.09 
WKS 1 5.96 1.98* 7.63 2.10* 
EX 3.76 4.34** 3.51 3.92** 
EXl 1 -0.06 -3.08** -0.05 -2.75* 
13 1 13.63 0.95 12. 38 0.84 
14 1 9.42 0.91 7.45 0.70 
15 1 11.27 0.56 3.93 0.19 
16 1 -0.09 -0.01 -3.01 -0.19 
17 1 -2.65 -0.27 -6.37 -0.63 
18 1 -11.14 -0.82 -13.63 -0.97 
El 1 -35.82 - 3 . 0 5 * *  -37.87 -3.13** 
EM 1 -11.14 -1. 32 -11.00 -1.26 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
3. 31 7 
1.5x10" 
0.40 
0.94 
-0.65 
1.4x10 G 
-0.08 
0. 85 
DIST 1 0.09 _g 1.09 0.07 0 . 8 9  
S 1 1.4x10 G -0.65 -3.9x10"" - 0 . 3 6  
MAP 1 -0.81 -0.01 18.76 0.21 
T 1 -27.09 -0.25 -20.77 -0.19 
. 8049 
41 
.7915 
41 
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Table B9. Mexican-American earnings, crafts 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. ' t-value 
INT 1 54.86 
MAR 1 -26.27 
HRS 1 5.42 
WKS 1 2.99 
EX 1 0.26 
EXl 1 0.002 
13 1 -2.39 
14 1 -19.49 
15 1 -8.46 
16 1 -22.43 
17 1 -38.97 
19 1 -20.52 
El 1 -11.16 
EM 1 8.87 
EN 1 12.90 7 
SIZE 1 2.5x10" 
DIST 1 -0.01 p. 
S 1 -l.lxlO' 
MAP 1 -143.90 
T 1 130.63 
r2 
2.32* 50.53 2.19** 
-2.73** -24.59 -2.62** 
1.78 5.91 2,00* 
0.98 2.30 0.77 
0.29 0.38 0.43 
0.14 -5.0x10"- -0.03 
-0.23 -4.67 -0.45 
-1,72 -21.36 -1.93 
-0.70 -7.16 -0.60 
-1.31 -24.88 -1.49 
-2.66** -37.71 -2.64 
-1.67 -22.81 -1.90 
-1.51 -9.59 -1.33 
1.14 3.90 1.17 
1.14 11.59 ^ 1.05 
2.14* 2.0x10" 1.81 
-0.22 0.01 , 0.22 
-0.10 -6.4x10"^ -0.61 
-1.77 -130.23 -1.64 
1.06 141.47 1.17 
.3306 
N 100 100 
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Table BIO. Mexican-Americaii earnings, laborers and 
service, all data 
Nominal Real 
Variable DF Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
INT 1 16.07 1.10 12.66 0.84 
MAR 1 -7.57 -1.40 -7.52 -1.34 
HRS 1 2.47 1.96* 2.92 2.25* 
WKS 1 7.89 5.87** 8.13 5.85** 
EX 1 1.34 3.17** 1.18 2.71** 
EXl 1 -0.02 -2.47* -0.02 -2.13* 
11 1 -5.84 -0.61 -6.19 -0.63 
13 1 14.17 1.45 15.97 1.58 
14 1 9.52 1.07 9:09 0.99 
15 1 3.91 0.40 3.24 0.32 
16 1 3.65 0.34 5.06 0.46 
17 1 0.46 0.05 0.002 0.00 
19 1 -11.12 -1.08 -11.64 -1.09 
110 2 -7.01 -0.62 -8.76 -0.74 
El 1 -18.70 -3.07** -17.49 -2.77** 
EK 1 -7.25 -1.27 -7.47 -1.26 
EN 
SIZE 
1 
1 
4.55 
4.9x10' 7 O 
0.53 
0.63 
1.18 
9.5x10" •8 
0.13 
0.13 
DIST 
S 
1 
1 
2.0x10" 
1.3x10" 
• O 
•5 0.05 
-0.22 
0.014 
3.3x10" •5 
0.33 
-0.54 
MAP 1 -116,49 -2.41* -107.60 -2.15* 
T 1 121.10 1. 76 128.81 1.81 
.3772 .3346 
N 245 245 
